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BACK TO THE FUTURE WITH PRIVILEGES
ABANDON CODIFICATION, NOT THE
COMMON LAW
Paul R. Rice*
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
A subcommittee of the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee is working on the codification of privilege rules that were
so controversial when the evidence code was originally proposed that
Article V, containing all relationship privilege proposals, was
eliminated from the proposed code to ensure its adoption.' I oppose
this effort by the Advisory Committee, not because of the inherent
absence of value in codification, 2 but because the process that has
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law.
Author, ATroRNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES (Thompson
West 2d ed. 1999); ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW (Rice
Publishing CD-ROM 2004). Director, Evidence Project, Washington College
of Law. Former special master in United States v. AT&T (divestiture action),
South Pacific Communications Co. v. AT&T (antitrust action), In re
Amoxicillin (patent infringement and antitrust action), and most recently
special counsel in In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No.
1332 (D. Md. 2003) (both consumer and competitor cases) and Coordination
Proceedings: Microsoft I-V Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 Class Action (Cal. 2003)
(ruling on over 70,000 privilege claims).
I acknowledge the assistance of my colleagues who gave many helpful
editorial comments on this article: David Aaronson, David Crump, David
Caudill, and Penelope Pether. Thanks also to Peter White for his research
assistance.
1. In contrast, situational or topical privileges, like subsequent remedial
measures, Rule 407, and offers of compromise, Rules 408 and 410 were
codified. Consequently, they are not the subject of this proposed codification
in Article V. They are addressed in this article only to the extent they contain
issues that have been unaddressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee.
2. Indeed, the codification of rules has reduced inconsistencies within the
federal courts and between federal and state courts where the federal rules have
been adopted. That benefit, however, is not eliminated if the Federal Rules of
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been established for maintaining all codified procedural rules has
proven less effective in accommodating the evolution of evidence
rules than the common law alternative it replaced.
My doubts about the value of codifying privilege rules are based
upon a comparison of advances within the Federal Rules of Evidence
(looking at existing problems and enacted solutions), and common
law developments in the jurisprudence of the most frequently
litigated privilege-the attorney-client privilege. This privilege is
deceptively complicated in its many applications. It has
continuously evolved over many centuries and is still changing with
technological advances, litigation needs, and judicial attitudes about
its underlying principles. My own treatise on the privilege and the
procedures that control its assertion and resolution comprises more
than 2,000 pages. 3 At best, codification would only memorialize the
privilege's skeletal outlines at a particular point in evolution.
Codified generalizations would accomplish far too little to justify the
probable stifling effect they would have on this long, continuing,
robust evolution. While my argument can be criticized for being
premised on experiences with only one of the many privileges being
considered for codification, the history of the United States Judicial
Conference's willingness or ability to fulfill its stewardship
responsibility to the entire evidence code suggests that the evolution
of all evidentiary doctrine has been, and will continue to be, retarded
by codification.
When compared to the dynamic change witnessed in our
privilege jurisprudence under common law principles over the past
thirty years, our experiment with codified evidence rules, and the
Judicial Conference's demonstrated unwillingness to address a range
of problems either ignored or created in that codification, strongly
suggests that case-by-case, judicially interpreted common law is a
vastly superior means through which to create or revise evidence
rules. In fact, the exercise of judicial rule-making power under the
common law has been the principal driving force behind the
Evidence Advisory Committee's actions-providing the basis for the
Evidence were not a binding code but a compilation of established practices
and preferred approaches recommended by the Advisory Committee and
approved by the U.S. Judicial Conference.
3. PAuL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1999).
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Committee's actions and solutions. As long as the Judicial
Conference refuses to adequately attend to the large number of
problems within the existing evidence codes, which in many
instances have existed for over three decades, any effort by the
Judicial Conference, through its Advisory Committee, to pile
additional management responsibilities on its platter through
codification of privilege rules should be resisted.
I believe that the comparative evolution of privilege rules
through case-by-case decisions and the evidence code through the
quasi-legislative Advisory Committee process, suggests two things.
First, it suggests that privileges should be left untouched. Second, it
suggests that all evidence rules might be far better served if the
Federal Rules of Evidence were not binding, but were rather
suggested practices based on the Advisory Committee's survey of
judicial decisions, academic literature, and ongoing public debates.
This way the Judicial Conference's unwillingness or inability to
respond to developing evidentiary needs would have a far less
negative impact on the development and evolution of our evidence
jurisprudence.
The rule-making process and its ability to maintain the existing
evidence rules has proven to be a poor substitute for the common law
power of judges to mold the rules on a case-by-case basis as needs
arise. Our rules have evolved over centuries and they continue to
evolve as judges, pursuing just adjudications, are required to
"interpret" them to meet changing problems posed by novel factual
situations. The difference under our codified system is that the
evolution of our rules is slowed by the injection of a quasi-legislative
process that waits to see what sitting judges are experiencing, how
they are lining up behind competing theories, whether a problem is
important enough for the Committee's attention and what special
interests have to say, before the codification process is even initiated.
In the interim, of course, trial judges must address the problems the
Advisory Committee turns its back on, because they have no choice.
Moreover, they must be accomplish this through exercise of their
inherent judicial power, which was supposedly superseded and
restricted by the codification of the rules they are applying (or
occasionally ignoring). Once the Judicial Conference has acted,
codification gives rise to distracting and, perhaps, unproductive
debates in the trial and appellate courts about the specific language
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of the codified rule, and not the principles and policies that each
recognized rule was designed to further, i.e., debates of form over
substance.
If experience with the attorney-client privilege is indicative of
developments in other areas of privilege, the most compelling reason
to oppose the codification of privilege rules is the vitality of the
evolution of privilege jurisprudence under the common law
principles that judges have applied under Article V of the Evidence
Code. In contrast to experiences with virtually all of the codified
evidence rules under the Advisory Committee's jurisdiction, there
have been significant changes in the attorney-client privilege since
the promulgation of the Evidence Rules in early 1973 and the
relegation of privilege jurisprudence in Rule 501 to "principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted... in the light of reason and
experience."
4
The Federal Judicial Conference has been intransigent in
addressing issues in other articles of the Evidence Code. 5 In state
systems, however, privileges have been codified and, as a
consequence, stymied in their evolution. 6  Given these facts, the
probabilities are quite high that few of the positive developments
currently experienced in the federal system would have materialized
had Article V been codified as originally proposed.
Initially, I will survey the nature of the Advisory Committee
process and examine what it has accomplished, what it has not
accomplished, and reasons it has given for its inaction. Thereafter, I
will examine the apparent principles followed by the Committee in
fulfilling its stewardship responsibilities. Next, I will explore the
dynamic evolution of the attorney-client privilege under the common
law principles that have governed the Evidence Rules since their
adoption, and contrast developments with the Committee's
demonstrated management principles. Next, I will conclude that the
proposed expansion in the responsibilities of the Advisory
4. FED. R. EvID. 501.
5. For an examination of these failures, see The Evidence Project,
Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330 (1997);
Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending
to the Past and Pretendingfor the Future?, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 817 (2002); Paul
R. Rice & W. Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee: A Short
History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000).
6. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 200.
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Committee should be rejected until the flaws in that process have
been resolved and all of the issues over which the Judicial
Conference has had jurisdiction for over thirty years have been
addressed.
II. THE QUASI-LEGISLATIVE PROCESS UNDER THE
RULES ENABLING ACT
A. A Brief History
In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act and charged
the Federal Judicial Conference (made up of Article III judges) with
the responsibility of maintaining the procedural codes employed in
federal courts.7 Initially, this included supervision of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Later, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were added. Over time, this responsibility grew to include
Appellate Rules and Bankruptcy Rules. While the original Con-
gressional charge to the Judicial Conference probably included the
Federal Rules of Evidence that were enacted in 1973, the Rules
Enabling Act was amended in 1988 specifically to include evidenti-
ary rules within the ambit of the Judicial Conference's rule-making
powers. 8 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who controls the
creation of Advisory Committees and the appointment of all their
members, refused to assemble an Advisory Committee, on the
Federal Rules of Evidence (hereafter Committee) until 1993. In the
interim, the maintenance of the evidence rules was relegated to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures Advisory Committee where the
evidence code and its problems were ignored like the poor stepsister,
Cinderella.
7. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064. Within this Act, Congress
"delegated almost all rulemaking authority to the judiciary, reserving to itself
the post facto right to reject, enact, amend, or defer any of the rules." Peter G.
McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1655, 1658 (1995). Originally delegated to the Supreme Court, the power to
prescribe rules was transferred by Congress to the Judicial Conference of the
United States in 1958. Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000)).
8. Pub. L. No. 100-702, sec. 401(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988).
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B. The Judicial Conference 's Management of Currently
Codified Rules
In previous books, reports, and articles, I have been critical of
the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 9 It is not that the Committee has accomplished nothing
in its short tenure. To be sure, a number of significant changes have
been made. The problem lies with what the Committee has not
done-and what under its current structure and management
philosophy, probably will not do--compared to the number, range
and size of the problems that have existed for decades. When
contrasted with the vitality of the evolution of attorney-client privi-
lege jurisprudence, the record of the Committee has been strikingly
inadequate.
The record of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence begins in 1993.10 Each year, the Committee's work is
summarized in minutes and published on its website. 1' Those
minutes are summarized below. Special focus is placed on the topics
that were broached by the Advisory Committee, but upon which no
action was taken, along with the reasons given. With an appreciation
that the Committee has acknowledged the broad range of problem
areas over the past thirty years and an understanding of what it has
not addressed and why, one can begin to see why those concerned
about the continued evolution of evidence rules in general might
oppose the codification of privilege rules. Contrasted with the
successful development of the attorney-client privilege over the same
time-frame, the conclusion is inescapable; the codification would
likely be far more detrimental than beneficial to the continued
evolution of that privilege.
9. See, e.g., PAUL R. RICE, BEST KEPT SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW: 101
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES & PITFALLS (2001); The Evidence Project, supra note
5; Rice, supra note 5; Rice & Delker, supra note 5; Paul R. Rice, Bring On The
Reformers: Evidence Code Cries Out for More Than Cautious Tinkering,
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998.
10. See The Fed. Judiciary, Federal Rulemaking: Dockets, Minutes,
and Reports: Minutes of Committee Meetings, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/minutes.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
11. These summaries have been condensed from the minutes of the
Advisory Committee published on the Advisory Committee's webpage at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules.
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1. What the Minutes Reveal About Management Style
In 1993-94, the first year of the Committee's existence, many
issues with many rules were discussed.' 2  Amendments were
approved and sent to the Standing Committee only on Rule 407
(product liability actions and subsequent remedial measures) and
Rule 103 (contemporaneous objections after motions in limine),
13
however, the Committee members first considered overruling
Huddleston v. United States,14 in which the clear and convincing
evidence requirement that prevailed under the common law was
found not to have been incorporated into Rule 404(b) when prior bad
acts were being offered. They did not, however, because it would
have been "political suicide."'15 There was nothing to fix, and it was
"a problematic area that could not be improved."' 16 The Committee
also considered resolving the conflict in Rule 201 regarding notice
and the taking of judicial notice on appeal, but it ignored the conflict
because "the rule was not used sufficiently."'17  The Committee
further discussed clarifying Rule 612 by stating that when materials
are used to refresh recollection, an opponent can offer those
materials into the record only for impeachment purposes, but in the
end it delayed action because such a change might be nothing more
than an "academic exercise." 18 The Committee also talked about the
poor drafting in Rule 608, but left it alone because the bad language
had "acquired a recognized meaning."' 9 Although the Committee
noted that there was much controversy about prior criminal offenses
admitted under Rule 609 and how much information could be
12. Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Evidence, Minutes of the
Meeting of Oct. 17-18, 1994, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/evlO-
17.htm [hereinafter Minutes of Oct. 17-18, 1994].
13. Id.
14. 485 U.S. 681 (1989).
15. Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Evidence, Minutes of the
Meeting of May 9-10, 1994, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ev5-9.htm
[hereinafter Minutes of May 9-10, 1994).
16. Id.
17. Advisory Comm. on of Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting
of Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1993, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ev9-30.htm
[hereinafter Minutes of Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1993].
18. Id.
19. Id.
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brought out about them, it elected to do nothing because it did not
want to "open a Pandora's box."
20
In 1995, its second year of existence, the Committee approved
amendments to Rule 804(b)(3) by making the corroboration
requirement for declarations against interests applicable to both the
government and defendants, and it attempted to clarify new evidence
rules2 1 that were proposed to Congress outside the Rules Enabling
22Act Process. The Committee also discussed Congress' proposals to
amend Rule 702 by creating a new test for expertise based on
"scientific knowledge," 23 but chose to wait until the Supreme Court
decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 24 The
Committee noted that problems existed in the definition of hearsay in
Rule 801, but agreed that there would be no "wholesale overhaul of
the hearsay rule as any such action would require a massive reeduca-
tion of the Bar." 25 The Committee also voiced concerns about Rule
803(3) regarding the state of mind of a declarant being offered to
prove the conduct of a third party, but took no action and gave no
reason for not doing so.26 It further acknowledged the inconsistency
between all other hearsay exceptions and the limitation on past
recollection recorded Rule 803(5) and learned treatises, Rule
803(18), which make evidence admitted under those exceptions
inadmissible as an exhibit, and therefore unavailable to the jury
during deliberations.2 7 The Committee also discussed the practice of
using Rule 803(6), the business records exception, when reports are
excluded under Rule 803(8), the public records exception. Since
20. Id.
21. Rules 413-415 require the introduction of evidence of similar crimes
and acts when offered against individuals charged with sexual assault of adults
and child molestation.
22. This effort was to no avail. Congress enacted the provisions despite the
Committee's concerns. Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Evidence, Minutes
of the Meeting of Jan. 9-10, 1995, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
EVO I95.pdf [hereinafter Minutes of Jan. 9-10, 1995].
23. Id. at 2.
24. 590 U.S. 579 (1993); Minutes of Jan. 9-10, 1995, supra note 22, at 4.
25. Minutes of Jan. 9-10, 1995, supra note 22, at 4.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Evidence, Minutes of the
Meeting of May 4-5, 1995, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/min-
ev5.htm [hereinafter Minutes of May 4-5, 1995].
BACK TO THE FUTURE
the reported cases, however, did not reflect that too great a problem
was materializing, the Committee determined "there was no need to
amend the rule."
2
Additionally, the Committee recognized that Rule 803(8)(B),
which precludes a criminal defendant from using governmental
reports based on personal knowledge of government agents against
the government, was inconsistent with the broader provisions in Rule
803(8)(C). The Committee speculated that the wording of the
provision was probably a "drafting error," 30 but since the courts that
have considered the issue have ignored the limitation, the Committee
saw "no need to amend the provision."
31
Moreover, the Committee pondered the ambiguity in the term
"predecessor in interest" in Rule 804(b)(1), but took no action
because prior testimony (1) could not be used against a defendant in
a criminal case, (2) did not appear, from reported decisions, to have
been a problem when used against the government in a criminal case,
and (3) would likely be admissible anyway under the residual excep-
tion in civil cases. 32 The Committee also discussed moving the
residual exception in Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) to a new Rule 807
to make room for more numbers in each rule.33  Finally, the
Committee rejected without explanation the proposal to amend Rule
1006 so as to clarify the evidentiary status of summaries. 34 Other
questions and issues were raised and the Reporter was asked to study
them, determine what courts were doing, and report back.35
In 1996, the Committee appeared to address significantly fewer
issues. In its third year of existence, the Committee approved
changes to Rule 407 originally sent to the Standing Committee in
1993, extending it to product liability cases and sent it to the
Standing Committee. 36 The Committee, however, rejected efforts to
restyle the rule because there was a "freeze on a comprehensive
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting
of Apr. 22, 1996, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ev4-2 2 96 .htm
[hereinafter Minutes of Apr. 22, 1996].
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restylization of the rules of evidence." 37 It changed the amendment
to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) from "may" to "shall" relative to the court's
consideration of the content of the statement in question in
determining its admissibility.
The Committee also approved Rule 804(b)(6), an exception to
the hearsay rule. 38 The approved exception requires a party to forfeit
the right to object to the admissibility of a statement made by a wit-
ness whose unavailability was caused, in part, by the wrongdoing of
the party. 39 In addition, the Committee concluded that changes to
Rule 201, judicial notice in criminal cases, were unwarranted
because "the Rule was not presenting a problem for courts or
counsel., 40 The Committee also broached the subject of presump-
tions.41 The Committee was of the opinion, however, that the
proposal "would be a massive project with uncertain results" and
therefore tabled it.
42
In 1997, the Committee approved and reported to the Standing
Committee a rule on in limine practice under Rule 103 dispensing
with the requirement of a contemporaneous objection at trial when
definitive rulings were made pretrial.43 The Committee approved an
amendment to Rule 404 permitting the prosecution to put on negative
defendant character evidence after the defendant has challenged the
character of the victim, because of the provisions in the Omnibus
Crime Bill. The Committee agreed that Rule 701, lay opinions,
needed to be revised to avoid having expert witnesses called as lay
witnesses, and that Rule 702 needed to be revised to provide "general
standards that would guide a trial court in determining whether
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Minutes of Apr. 22, 1996, supra note 36.
40. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting
of Nov. 12, 1996, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/min-ev 11 - 296.htm
[hereinafter Minutes of Nov. 12, 1996].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting
of Apr. 14-15, 1997, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ev4-97.htm
[hereinafter Minutes of Apr. 14-15, 1997].
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expert testimony is sufficiently reliable." 44 Action, however, was
deferred.
Rule 703 was being used as a backdoor means of introducing
hearsay evidence, but the Committee took no action. It did approve
amendments to Rule 803(6), business records, and adopted new rules
for authenticating business records by certification in Rules 901(11)
and 902(12). 45 The Committee also discussed amendments to Rule
706 with the appointment of experts by the court and decided that
such appointments were not so prevalent that amendments were
required. In addition, it rejected proposals to codify procedural
requirement under Rules 404(b), prior bad acts and Rule 609, prior
convictions, since the Rules were "working well under an
extensively developed case law," and since mandated procedures
might lead to unnecessary reversals based solely on procedural
irregularities.46
Opinion rules dominated the Committee's work in 1998. It
amended Rule 702 because there were disagreements over the
meaning of Daubert, and because Congressional attempts involved
"problematic language. 4 7  The Committee's guidance to judges
consisted of three requirements: (1) that there be "sufficient and
reliable information," (2) that the "expert must employ reliable prin-
ciples and methodology," and (3) that the principles and
methodology be applied "reliably. ' '48 It again amended Rule 701 to
preclude expert witnesses from being called as lay witnesses, and
also from giving expert testimony without having complied with the
expert witness disclosures requirements under Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 49 The amendment tracked the language of
Rule 702 and precluded lay witnesses from giving testimony based
on "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."
50
44. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Oct.
20-21, 1997, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ev10-97.htm [hereinafter
Minutes of Oct. 20-21, 1997].
45. Id.
46. Minutes of Apr. 14-15, 1997, supra note 43.
47. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Apr.
6-7, 1998, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/0498evidenceminutes.htm
[hereinafter Minutes of Apr. 6-7, 1998].
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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The Committee also amended Rule 703 to permit the proponent
of an expert witness who relied on inadmissible evidence to delineate
that evidence only if the probative value of the inadmissible evidence
"substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect." 51 Additionally, the
Committee proposed a hearsay exception for prior consistent
statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) for rehabilitative
purpose.52 This proposed exception, however, was rejected due to
the absence of problems of a "substantial" nature. 53 The Committee
rejected the suggestion that the rules be updated to accommodate
computerized evidence since the courts were "handling computerized
evidence quite well under the broad and flexible Evidence Rules." 54
The Committee consequently expressed the view that "tinkering with
language [might] create rather than solve problems."
55
In 1999, after considering public comments on proposed
changes to Rules 103, 404(a), 701, 702 and 703, 803(6), and 902(11)
and (12), the Committee approved minor changes and sent the Rules
to the Judicial Conference. 56 The Committee concluded that further
study was warranted with respect to other rules.57 It took no action
on the subject of technological advances and the presentation of
evidence, concluding that changes would be "costly and potentially
confusing, and unwarranted given the fact that courts and litigants
have had no problem in handling technological advances under the
current Evidence Rules."
58
Despite acknowledging that some confusion existed about prior
consistent statements offered under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and whether
prior consistent statements were admissible for truth after being
offered "to support [a] witness' credibility," the Committee
concluded that the problem was "not so serious as to require
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Apr.
12-13, 1999, at 2, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/499minEV.pdf.
57. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of
Oct. 25, 1999, at 5-7, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1099mnEV.pdf
[hereinafter Minutes of Oct. 25, 1999].
58. Id. at 6.
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proposing an amendment at this time."5 9 The Committee further
noted that there was confusion about whether the extrinsic evidence
rule in 608(b) was also applicable to extrinsic evidence of bias and
simple contradiction, and instructed the Reporter to prepare a report
on the size of this problem.60 Initial reactions to revisions, however,
were unfavorable because "any amendment would require more than
a simple substitution of one word for another." 61 The Committee
asked the Reporter to prepare a background report on the
corroboration requirement in Rule 804(b)(3) because courts appeared
to be in disarray.62 Under this Rule, corroboration is only required
when the criminal defendant offers declarations against an interest to
exonerate himself. 63
In 2000, the Committee discussed the authentication of online
materials, but concluded the problems were manageable under the
existing authentication provisions of Rule 901.64 Self-authentication
was thought to be out of the question because forgery was so easy on
the Internet. The Committee approved an amendment that
substituted "character for truthfulness" for the word "credibility" in
Rule 608(b).65 The revisions were thought necessary because Rule
608(b) literally precludes extrinsic evidence when used to impeach a
witness's "credibility." 66  Consequently, Rule 608(b) excluded
evidence of bias, prior inconsistent statements, contradiction, or lack
of capacity. 67 The Rule is intended to preclude extrinsic evidence
only when the evidence is offered on the character trait of
truthfulness relative to prior acts asked about on cross-examination.
68
The Committee rejected a proposal to allow learned treatises to be
admitted into evidence without a statement of reason.69 Finally, the
Committee approved an amendment to Rule 804(b)(3) (declarations
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Apr.
17, 2000, at 4-6, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/400EVMin.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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against interests), extending the corroboration requirement from
defendants who sought to exculpate themselves to all declarations
against penal interests.
70
In 2001, the Committee approved amendments previously
proposed for Rules 608(b) and 804(b)(3) and released them for
public comment.7' It also discussed the proposals being drafted by
the subcommittee on privileges, and approved certain approaches.
72
In addition, the Committee ordered a report from the Reporter
regarding whether Rule 803(4) should be amended to preclude
statements by patients who had gone to a doctor solely for the
purpose of preparing for litigation in light of the recent amendment
to Rule 703. 73
In 2002, the Committee rejected several proposed amendments
to the proposed revisions to Rule 608(b), and approved revisions for
submission to the Judicial Conference.74 The Committee also
discussed a list of additional rules containing what it termed "long-
term projects." 75 It took no actions, however, other than to instruct
70. Id. at 9.
71. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Apr.
19, 2001, at 4-6, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/401EVMin.pdf
[hereinafter Minutes of Apr. 19, 2001].
72. Id. at 8.
73. Id. at 14.
74. Advisory Comm. On Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of
Apr. 19, 2002, at 5, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/402EVMin.pdf
[hereinafter Minutes of Apr. 19, 2002].
75. These rules and issues included: (a) the rule of completeness in Rule
106 and its application of oral statements (subsequently rejected); (b) the
admission of character propensity evidence under Rule 404(a) in civil cases
that feel criminal in nature (this was tentatively agreed to and proposals were
sought from the Reporter); (c) the admission of offers of compromise under
Rule 408 in subsequent criminal cases (subsequently tentatively approved
subject to written proposals); (d) inconsistencies in the rape shield law of Rule
412 (subsequently rejected); (e) calling witnesses solely for the purpose of
impeaching them under the authority of Rule 607; (f) whether crimes of
dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609(a)(2) should be decided on the
basis of the deceitful means by which the crime was committed or the elements
of the crime; (g) whether a foundation is still required under Rule 613(b)
before evidence of prior inconsistent statements are admissible; (h) whether
Rule 704(b) applies only to expert witnesses or all witnesses; (i) whether
statements reflecting one person's state of mind under Rule 803(3) can be used
to prove another persons conduct; () whether there is a conflict between the
theory underlying permitting doctors to testify to a patient's statements who
consulted them solely for the purpose of preparing testimony for trial and the
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76
the Reporter to prepare a full report. It did not pursue bigger issues
going to the underlying rationale of particular rules because changing
the rules would (1) "upset settled expectations" based on Supreme
Court decisions,77 (2) "upset substantial, ingrained expectations and
[possibly] inadvertent[ly] overrul[e] a large number of 
opinions," 78
(3) "substantially change the case law,",79 (4) "meet substantial
opposition from the Justice Department," 80 and (5) "upset[] settled
practices and expectations.'' 1 The Committee rejected a proposal to
explicitly modify Rules 413-415 by Rule 403 because "there [was]
no need to amend the Rules in light of judicial unanimity" in
applying Rule 403 to those rules. 82 The Committee also rejected the
suggestion to change Rule 803(4) to exclude statements made to
doctors solely for the purpose of developing testimony for trial.8 3
The Committee also ordered further study of Rule 806,
impeaching declarants with prior bad acts under Rule 608(b), and
Rule 901, authenticating digital evidence. 84  Ultimately, the
Committee decided not to take further action on a number of other
rules because they "presented [] policy question[s] that most courts
had already worked through" or presented problems that had "been
new revisions to Rule 703; (k) whether past recollection recorded can be
authenticated by a tandem of witnesses rather than one witness who adopted it;
(1) whether the business records exception in Rule 803(6) should be clarified to
make clear that the person with a duty to a business must also have personal
knowledge; and (m) whether electronic evidence can qualify as a learned
treatise under Rule 803(18). Id. at 14-23.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id. at 15.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 20. These included (a) the distinction between relevance and
condition relevance in Rule 104(b); (b) any changes to Rules 401-403 relative
to determining relevance and balancing interests of prejudice to exclude it; (c)
clarifying the assertive/nonassertive distinction in Rule 801(a); and (d) the
confusing category of statements that are hearsay, but classified as non-hearsay
under Rules 801 (d).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 21.
84. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of
Oct. 18, 2002, at 11, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1002EVMin.pdf
[hereinafter Minutes of Oct. 18, 2002].
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handled adequately by the courts, and [had] not created a problem
that [had] affected the results in the cases."
8 5
In 2003, the Committee approved revision to Rule 804(b)(3),
deleting proposed extension to civil cases. 86 The Committee also
terminated consideration of the revisions to Rule 106 to extend the
rule of completeness to oral statements,87 and to Rule 404(a)(1)
because clarification was unnecessary. 88  It also terminated
consideration of a revision of Rule 803(6) to clarify that business
records had to be made by someone with personal knowledge and a
business duty to the business keeping the records, because courts had
approached the problem with "flexibility" and were not getting it
wrong.89 Finally, the Committee approved a tentative amendment to
Rule 410 that would give protection to statements made by the
prosecutor in plea discussions.
90
The preceding summary of the Committee's work over the past
ten years, and discussions that this writer has had with past
committee members over the same period,91 reveal three principles.
The first is that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." The second is that
certain rules are off-limits. The third is that less is better than more.
a. "If it ain't broke, don 'tfix it"
From the time the Evidence Advisory Committee was initially
established, Chief Justice Rehnquist has given clear instructions to
85. Id. at 14. These rules included Rule 804(a)(5) (deposition preference
for hearsay exceptions premised on unavailability), Rule 804(b)(1) (different
interpretations of "predecessor in interest"), Rule 807 (using the residual
exception in "near miss" situations involving other rules), Rules 902(1), (2)
and (6) (question of self-authentication with seals and of internet materials),
and Rule 1006 (the inconsistent ways in which judges are permitting
summaries to be used).
86. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Apr.
25, 2003, at 4, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/403EVMin.pdf
[hereinafter Minutes of Apr. 25, 2003].
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 10.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 16.
91. These discussions occurred as The Evidence Project was completing its
evaluation of the Evidence Code and I, as its Director, was attempting to
ascertain how the Project could work with the Advisory Committee in
presenting the issues that the Project had identified, along with proposed
revisions to address them.
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all of the chairpersons he has appointed that revisions should be
minimal---only those necessary to correct pressing problems. 92 As a
consequence, members have lived by the professed motto, "If it ain't
broke, don't fix it."93  Many of those deferential members have
translated the principle to mean "it ain't broke if it ain't stopping
traffic." This is illustrated by the Commission's refusal to address the
issues in rules such as 803(3), declarant's state mind statements
being used to prove the conduct of a third-party ("I am going out
with Frank tonight" offered to prove that Frank was with the
declarant); 804(b)(1), the ambiguity in the term "predecessor in inter-
est" that limits the admissibility of prior testimony of third parties
(whether this testimony is admissible from a party with only a
common factual interest, or whether it must have been given by a
party through whom title was derived); 801 (d)(1)(B), purposes for
which consistent statements could be offered into evidence (whether
all such statements are admissible for truth and for impeachment
purposes); Rule 607, the practice of calling witnesses solely for the
purpose of impeaching them under the Rule (whether the surprise
and damage requirements are carried over from the common law);
and Rule 613(b), the foundation dispute (whether it is still required
prior to offering evidence of inconsistent statements). In each of
these instances, action was not taken because the courts were
successfully handling problems in the flawed rules.
As a consequence, many ambiguities, inconsistencies, omis-
sions, and ill-conceived ideas codified in the original code have
never been addressed. 94 Many problems have not been perceived as
such because trial judges, in interpreting and applying these problem
rules, have exercised their inherent power to interpret and apply the
rules on an ad hoc basis to avoid unfairness. As a consequence, the
Advisory Committee has swept those problems under the rug and
ignored them. Through judicial activism the Evidence Code has
often been successful because the judges on the front lines have, on a
92. Three past chairpersons of the Committee acknowledge this in personal
interviews with this author.
93. In discussions with both past and current members of the Advisory
Committee, this admonition was quoted to me, without prompting, during
virtually every conversation.
94. These problems were catalogued in a report by The Evidence Project of
the American University Washington College of Law. The Evidence Project,
supra note 5.
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case-by-case basis, done the work of the Federal Judicial
Conference-a service that in the past was called common law rule
making. This has resulted in few efforts to make the Rules of
Evidence better. Rather, the efforts have been directed at the
Conference's others responsibility, to make the rules more
functional.
The most recent examples of issues ignored, because they are
being dealt with in practice, relate to Rules 413-415. Under these
rules, prior sexual misconduct "is admissible" in certain types of
cases. 9 5  While the rules incorporate no explicit exceptions to
admissibility, courts have unanimously concluded that they are
modified by Rule 403, which excludes otherwise admissible
evidence when the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.96 When this issue was
brought to the attention of the Advisory Committee, the Committee
decided not to proceed with amendments to the rules, noting "that
every case construing these Rules has held that Rule 403 is applic-
able, so there is no need to amend the Rules in light of this judicial
unanimity." 97  What would have been helpful, as opposed to
modifying these rules to address this specific issue, would have been
to clarify that Rule 403 modifies all other rules unless specific
language in a given rule supersedes or excludes it.
If the purpose of codification is to give structure and guidance,
the language of the rule should reflect all "revisions" to the rule,
regardless of whether they are created legislatively or judicially.
This is particularly true where a rule's language appears to be incon-
sistent with a judicially accepted practice. Perhaps the real reason
the Committee did not act upon these rules is they were enacted
outside the Rules Enabling Act process, notwithstanding the
Advisory Committee's resistance. Perhaps the Committee did not
want to offend Congress.
98
The members of the Committee have explained their reticent to
take a proactive role to maintain the Evidence Code out of a fear that
changes will create more problems than they solve, because each
95. FED. R. EvrD. 413-415.
96. FED. R. EviD. 403.
97. Minutes of Apr. 19, 2002, supra note 74, at 17.
98. This goes to the second of the principles that certain rules are off-limits.
See infra text accompanying note 144.
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change-no matter how appropriate-gives rise to additional
litigation.99 While increased litigation about the rules undoubtedly is
an irritation for judges who don't want to be bothered with learning
new rules and dealing with the adversarial squabbling that inevitably
results among lawyers over their interpretation and application, this
is inevitable in any system that is not stagnant. The disputes must be
accepted as a cost of evolution and progress. Such adversarial
squabbles reflect the vitality of the common law process and of our
profession. It is an asset, not a liability.1
0 0
Some judges perceive that the Committee's rule changes give
rise to more squabbling than occurred under the common law. This
is probably more perception than reality because the common law
squabbling typically took place over a much longer time period. The
theoretical advantage of codification is that whatever good comes
from change can come more quickly. That good, however, will
usually come with the immediate cost of condensed periods of
irritation while the scope and limits of each rule are explored. If the
Judicial Conference, through its Evidence Advisory Committee, is
not willing to accept and embrace these disputes, then it should not
have the responsibility for maintaining the Evidence Code.
Despite the Committee's insistence that it does not act unless a
demonstrated problem needs to be solved, it has made revisions in
response to special interests of either its members or groups that have
lobbied it. One example is the revision of the co-conspirator
admission rule following the Supreme Court's decision in Bourjaily
v. United States.10 1 There was wide dissatisfaction with this decision
because it construed Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as rejecting centuries of case
law requiring the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's
participation in the conspiracy be established with evidence inde-
pendent of the content of the statement in question. While resolving
(1) not to codify Bourjaily, (2) not to reject the Court's interpretation
of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and (3) not to impose a corroboration
requirement, the Committee voted to make one change in the co-
conspirator admissions rule. It added an additional clause acknow-
99. Minutes of Apr. 19, 2001, supra note 74, at 2, 14.
100. At some point, of course, the level of squabbling may indicate that the
Advisory Committee's revisions may have been ill-advised or inadequate.
Surely feared incompetence cannot be an acceptable excuse for inaction.
101. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
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ledging that the content of the statement in question could be
considered, but specifying that the content of that statement, standing
alone, could not satisfy the standards for admitting such statements
under the rule.'0 2 While this was certainly a reasonable amendment
to the rule, there was not a single reported decision or unreported
decision in which a judge had even threatened to consider the
content, standing alone, to satisfy these standards. This action
violated the Committee's first informal principle, "If it ain't broke,
don't fix it." Acting in conflict with its own principles is hypocrisy,
and, of course, only breeds resentment and cynicism among those
whose proposals have been rejected by the Committee because they
did not correct an existing problem of a sufficiently pressing nature.
While triage is essential when resources are scarce and the need
for action is immediate, a time must come when the rest of the
injured and ill are treated. Over time it is unacceptable to say we
need not attend to the others because their injuries are minor and will
heal on their own. The unattended problems need to be addressed, if
for no other reason than to accommodate the new lawyers and judges
who are not familiar with the old practices and don't have time,
during the rush of courtroom evidentiary hearings, to do any more
than consult the language of the evidence rules. Under the Rules
Enabling Act and the Advisory Committee structure that has been
put in place, there is never a designated time when all problems will
be addressed and old assumptions will be questioned.
The issues unattended to in the Evidence Code are enormous.
This is reflected in the number of issues raised before the Committee
but never acted upon. The following is a cross-section of rules and
issues that have been left behind, and should be attended to by the
Committee before it receives additional responsibilities which may
also be ignored.
i. Article III, presumptions
Amending the presumption rules has become far more important
now that we have moved into the world of electronic commerce. 10 3
Authentication of e-mail messages, for example, poses a significant
102. Minutes of May 4-5, 1995, supra note 28.
103. The topic of presumptions and their potential value in the authentication
of electronic evidence is explored in detail in Chapter V of PAUL R. RICE, E-
EVIDENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (ABA 2004).
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problem for litigants. The Committee tabled discussions of
presumptions, noting that addressing them would involve a "massive
project" that would produce "uncertain results."'10 4 The estimation
that the project would be massive is probably correct, because the
codified provisions fail to recognize a single presumption; they have
only enacting rules that restricted the effect of presumptions to
shifting the burden of going forward with evidence. Nevertheless,
this undertaking has become critical with the advent of the electronic
age, the Web, and computer generated evidence.
The authentication of electronic communications has become an
increasingly important topic. Such authentication could be assisted
by the use of presumptions, if their purpose and effect were changed
to what was originally proposed, i.e., shifting the burden of
persuasion. For example, if an e-mail was proven to have originated
from a computer terminal controlled by a specific individual, and the
message purported to have been written by that individual, a
presumption that that person either wrote it or was responsible for it
is reasonable. In addition, because of that person's access to and
control of the computer terminal, it would be rational, fair and
efficient to shift the burden to the individual to prove that the person
was not responsible. One can only wonder why this topic was set
aside and why the Committee is now attempting to tackle the topic of
privileges that was so controversial when the rules were enacted they
were deleted from the code to ensure its passage. How can the
codification of privilege have any more "certain results" than the
codification of presumptions that most of us don't understand?
While it is true, as the Committee noted, "that courts and
litigants have had no problem in handling technological advances
under the current Evidence Rules,"' 1 5 it is also true that despite their
ability to function under current rules, courts and litigants could
function more effectively under improved rules. If this argument
were legitimate, we would never have experienced the revolutionary
changes that were brought about in Article X, which virtually
eliminated best evidence objections at trial by creating the category
of "duplicates" (electronically or mechanically produced copies) that
104. Minutes of Nov. 12, 1996, supra note 40.
105. Minutes of Oct. 25, 1999, supra note 57.
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are treated like originals. 10 6 Under the Best Evidence Rule, when
proving the content of documents, the original must be produced or
shown to be unavailable due to no fault of the proponent.10 7 While
this best evidence requirement was inconvenient and perhaps
unnecessarily restrictive, the problems that it posed were being
"handled adequately by the courts."'
10 8
ii. Article VI, witnesses
There is no specific rule on impeaching a witness with evidence
of bias. While courts universally permit such evidence to be
offered, 10 9 a conflict has arisen over whether a foundation must be
laid before offering extrinsic evidence of bias."10 The Committee has
never addressed this issue. Is this topic so unimportant that it does
not need to be addressed, or have courts handled it so well there is no
need to act? Neither is true. The issue frequently arises and courts
have been inconsistent in requiring that a foundation be laid before
extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove the same.
106. See FED. R. EvD. 1003 cmt. (1998) (commentary by Stephen A.
Saltzburg et al.).
107. FED. R. EviD. 1002.
108. Minutes of Oct. 18, 2002, supra note 84.
109. See United States v. Gambler, 662 F.2d 834, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Chipman v. Mercer, 628 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1980). In criminal cases,
demonstrating bias is part of the fundamental right of confrontation. Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
110. Compare United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1985)
(imposing a foundation requirement) and United States v. Harvey, 547 F.2d
720, 722 (2d Cir. 1976) (same), with United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310,
1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (not imposing a foundation requirement for racial bias).
Within the circuits that require a foundation there is a split over whether
the opportunity to confront and explain or deny must be afforded the witness.
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have required that the
witness be afforded the opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement
during cross-examination. United States v. Johnson, 965 F.2d 460, 465 (7th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1344 (5th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Cutler, 676 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
De Napoli, 557 F.2d 962, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Truslow,
530 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1975).
Other circuits have imposed a foundation requirement but have
interpreted it as requiring only that the witness be afforded the opportunity to
explain or deny the prior statement any time at trial. United States v. Hudson,
970 F.2d 948, 955 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Lynch, 800 F.2d 765 (8th
Cir. 1986); Wanmock v. Celotex Corp., 793 F.2d 1518, 1521-22 (11th Cir.
1986).
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Another unmet need exists in Rule 608, which permits the use of
character evidence and allows inquiry into a witness's past
conduct."' While the Advisory Committee has conceded that the
rule is poorly drafted and could stand to be clarified, the Committee
passed over correcting the problems because the bad language had
"acquired a recognized meaning."'"12  When will the Advisory
Committee get around to codifying the recognized meanings of terms
employed throughout the Code, assuming the meanings are desir-
able? When will the accumulation of these issues tip the
Committee's scales and compel a legislative response?
Rule 609, structuring the admission of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes, is so problematic that the Committee has
ignored it for fear of opening up a " Pandora's box."'"1 3 Why does
the Committee believe that the responsibility of wading through the
problems should be left solely to trial judges to deal with on a case-
by-case basis, rather than crafting a new rule that is perhaps more
logical and that gives more direction and better guidance as to when
prior convictions are appropriately admitted?
111. FED. R. EvID. 608. This rule, entitled Evidence of Character and
Conduct of Witnesses, reads as follows:
(a) OPINION AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER. The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in
the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1)
the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible
only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the
witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as
provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the
witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness
being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege
against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate
only to character for truthfulness.
112. See Minutes of Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1992, supra note 15.
113. Minutes of Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1993, supra note 17.
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iii. Article VII, opinion testimony
Under Rule 702, a scientific expert can testify on the basis of
"scientific knowledge" provided the scientific principles-the
methodologies through which the principles were employed and the
particular application of both principles and methodologies-are
shown to be "reliable." ' 14 The Supreme Court announced this in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 115 and in Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael. 116 It also mirrored in the Committee's revisions
to this Rule. 117 What neither the Supreme Court nor the Committee
addressed, however, was the fundamental question of why scientific
standards of reliability must be met when scientific truths are not
being sought in the courtroom, but only the resolution of a social
dispute by a preponderance of the evidence." 
8
Since the Daubert and Kumho Tire decisions, courts have been
inundated with Daubert hearings in every trial in which scientific or
technological evidence has been employed. 19 Since the Daubert
interpretation of Rule 702 was codified and this problem has
materialized over the past decade, it appears that the Committee has
made no attempt to guide judges as to when, if ever, it may be
appropriate to take judicial notice of principles, methodologies, and
application so as to avoid these time consuming hearings. The
Committee has never addressed questions that have existed in Article
114. Minutes of Apr. 6-7, 1998, supra note 47.
115. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
116. 526U.S. 137 (1999).
117. In Daubert the Court instructed trial judges to make a "preliminary
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly
can be applied to the facts in issue." 509 U.S. at 592-93. In response, Rule
702 was amended to require the trial judge to determine whether "the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods" and whether the
expert witness "has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case." See FED. R. EvID. 702.
118. This matter is discussed in more detail below. See infra text
accompanying notes 116-121.
119. This has resulted from the Daubert decision because the Frye "general
acceptance" test for admissibility was applicable only when novel science was
employed. 509 U.S. at 585. In Daubert and Kumho Tire, by contrast, the
Court made the new judicial gate-keeping role applicable to all scientific and
technological evidence, not just novel principles, methodologies, and
applications. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory, committee's note to 2000
Amendment.
BACK TO THE FUTURE
II, Judicial Notice, either because "the rule was not used sufficient-
ly' 20 or because "the Rule was not presenting a problem for courts
or counsel."' 12 1 The fact that an article in the Code is not used may,
in itself, reflect a problem, but even if identifiable problems have not
materialized for courts, attention to the Article could produce
solutions to other problems if the Committee reaches out to hear new
voices, ideas, and looks for less predictable solutions to old
problems. In this regard, it might be productive if the Committee
began to listen more closely to the advice it least expects.
Rule 703 permits experts to testify on the basis of inadmissible
evidence if it is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field.122 Experts are supposed to assist the finders of facts,
not supplant them. It is hard to understand, therefore, how the role of
experts is not implicitly changed by allowing them to testify on the
basis of evidence that the finders of fact may not hear. If this
changed role was unintended, why was Rule 703 amended to
preclude the inadmissible evidence from being brought to the
attention of the finders of fact unless its probative value is shown to
"substantially outweigh" its prejudicial effect? This only further
perpetuates and exacerbates the role change. We ought to give jurors
(the sole finders of facts) more information about the basis of the
expert's opinion, not less. We ought to stop making minor changes,
now and again, here and there. The time to reassess the entire series
of expert opinion rules has long since passed.
Even if this new burden to demonstrate that value "substantially
outweighs" prejudice is met, the Committee has left unaddressed the
question of the purpose for which jurors permitted to hear the
evidence can use it. Admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence only
to assess the value of an expert's testimony, and not for its truth,
perpetuates the logic of the now defunct common law practice of
letting a doctor testify to a patient's statements of medical history
and causation, while instructing jurors not to accept what was said
for its truth. In other words, the jurors could accept the doctor's
opinions premised on the truth of the evidence, but they could not
use the evidence to draw the same conclusions! The practice made
120. Minutes of Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1993, supra note 17.
121. Minutes of Nov. 12, 1996, supra note 40.
122. FED. R. EvID. 703.
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no sense then, and it makes no sense now. 123 Once the evidence has
been demonstrated to be reliable, it should be admissible for truth so
jurors can do what the expert assisting them has done-draw factual
conclusions based on evidence before them. When an illogical
practice has become entrenched, reexamining it in light of funda-
mental principles may radically alter "established expectations."
This is occasionally necessary for proper maintenance of the rules.
The Committee's willingness to sweep aside issues to accommodate
"established expectations" too often reflects little more than
unwillingness to confront established traditions and practices and,
where necessary, educate the judiciary.1
24
With the increased use of scientific and technological evidence
in the courtroom, expert opinion rules in Article VII have become
increasingly important. Consequently, it is ill-advised to leave their
interpretation and application to illogical traditions of past
generations, to whom they were less important, and upon whom they
had less of an impact. These rules, with all of their warts and
blemishes, should be the subject of a national debate without regard
to the specific language of the Advisory Committee's rules or of
Supreme Court decisions.
iv. Article VIII, hearsay
The definition of hearsay in Rule 801 incorporates the
assertive/nonassertive distinction,' 25 which admits unintended
123. This illogical practice with physicians was solved in Rule 803(4) by
permitting statements of medical history and causation to be considered for
their truth if reasonably pertinent to the patient's diagnosis or treatment. H.R.
DOc. No. 93-46, at 128 (1973). Rule 703, however, perpetuates the problem
for all other experts.
124. This has not only been a problem with Article VII and expert witness
testimony, the manner in which the judiciary has limited parties' use of
summaries under Rule 1006 has significantly eliminated the benefits of that
exception to the original writing rule. See discussion infra text accompanying
notes 140-150.
125. "'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." FED. R. Evil. 801. Rule 802 makes hearsay inadmissible"except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EviD.
802.
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statements of an out-of-court declarant as non-hearsay. 12' Even
though the hearsay problems of perception, memory and ambiguity
are still present, the statement is admitted for the truth of its content,
and since it was unintended, the statement must be sincere. 127 This
distinction is illogical to the point of being absurd. The most that a
nonassertive statement can guarantee is that it is sincerely erroneous.
To make matters worse, courts are interpreting and applying the
assertive/nonassertive distinction in different ways. One of these,
discussed below, is inconsistent with the flawed theory upon which
the rule is premised.
In United States v. Zenni, for example, the court applied the
"unintentionally assertive" distinction to implied messages from
words under Rule 801(a)(1). 128 In Zenni, an individual called an
establishment that was under surveillance because it was believed to
be a betting establishment, and attempted to place a bet. 129 Because
the caller intended to place the bet, but probably did not intend to say
that the establishment was a place that takes such bets, the court held
that when evidence of the bet was repeated in court to prove the
nature of the establishment, it was not hearsay. 130 Even though the
utterance of the words was intentional, because the implied message
read into the words was not "intended," the court held that it was
trustworthy to prove the truth of the implied assertion about the
establishment. 131 This result is nothing less than absurd! If the
direct, intended message is, for whatever reason, not trustworthy,
then by implication the implied message is not trustworthy either.
The offspring can be no more reliable than its source.
In contrast, the court in United States v. Reynolds reversed a
conviction because such an implied statement was used against the
126. Rule 801(a) defines the term "statement" used in the definition of
hearsay in subsection (c) as "(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." FED. R.
EVID. 801(a). The question posed by this definition is whether the last clause
relating to the intention of the declarant relates to only (2), nonverbal conduct,
or both verbal statements in (1) and (2).
127. FED. R. EvlD. 801.
128. 492 F. Supp. 464, 465-69 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
129. Id. at 465.
130. Id. at 469.
131. Id.
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defendant. 132 In Reynolds, a suspect, while under arrest and being
walked past his alleged co-conspirator, stated, "I didn't tell them
anything about you."' 33 The prosecution used this statement at trial
as an implied assertion that the alleged co-conspirator was guilty.
134
Even though the suspect in custody did not intend for his statement
to be an acknowledgment of the other's guilt-thereby making it
nonassertive and non-hearsay under the Zenni rationale-the court
held that it was error to use the evidence against the second
suspect. 135 It is difficult to understand how, given that the absence of
insincerity problems is the kingpin of the assertive/nonassertive
distinction, most verbal utterances would ever be nonassertive, since
making intentional assertions is the principal reason for language and
the use of words.
Following this line of reasoning, the Iowa Supreme Court
interpreted the assertive/nonassertive distinction in an equivalent
Rule 801(a) in the Iowa Rules of Evidence as not encompassing
unintended assertions from speech.136 Rejecting the logic of Zenni, it
held that unintended assertions of speech were "statements" excluded
by the hearsay rule.137 The Dullard court explained:
Four dangers are generally identified to justify the
exclusion of out-of-court statements under the hearsay rule:
erroneous memory, faulty perception, ambiguity, and
sincerity or misrepresentation. Yet, the distinction drawn
between intended and unintended conduct or speech only
implicates the danger of insincerity, based on the
assumption that a person who lacks an intent to assert
something also lacks an intent to misrepresent. The other
"hearsay dangers," however, remain viable, giving rise to
the need for cross-examination. Moreover, even the danger
of insincerity may continue to be present in those instances
132. 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983).
133. Id. at 103.
134. Id. at 104.
135. The Reynolds court apparently was convinced that the
assertive/nonassertive distinction did not apply to verbal utterances under
subsection (a)(1) because such utterances always involve an intention to speak,
and therefore injects potential insincerity back into the hearsay equation. The
court didn't even bother to discuss the distinction.
136. State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 594 (Iowa 2003).
137. Id.
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where the reliability of the direct assertion may be
questioned. If the expressed assertion is insincere, such as a
fabricated story, the implied assertion derived from the
expressed assertion will similarly be unreliable. Implied
assertions can be no more reliable than the predicate
expressed assertion.
We recognize this approach will have a tendency to
make most implied assertions hearsay. However, we view
this in a favorable manner because it means the evidence
will be judged for its admission at trial based on accepted
exceptions to the hearsay rule. It also establishes a better,
more straightforward rule for litigants and trial courts to
understand and apply. 1
38
The Committee has avoided correcting this flawed rule because
it would require a "wholesale overhaul of the hearsay rule" and
would "require a massive re-education of the Bar." 139 Why is this
excuse justifiable now, when it was not an excuse for recognizing the
assertive/nonassertive distinction in the first instance? When shall
logic and reason prevail?
v. Article X, contents of writings, recordings,
and photographs
Article X, Contents of Writings, Recordings and Photographs,
was the most progressive and successful of all the Articles that were
originally codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence. It virtually
eliminated best evidence objections 40 during trial because it
recognized "duplicates," mechanically produced copies, and treated
them like originals. 141 Rule 1006 permits summaries to be used in
138. Id. at 594-95 (citations omitted) (citing, inter alia, Paul R. Rice, Should
Unintended Implications of Speech be Considered Nonhearsay? The
Assertive/Nonassertive Distinction Under Rule 801(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 529, 538 (1992)).
139. Minutes of Jan. 9-10, 1995, supra note 22, at 4.
140. When the content of a writing is being proven, the Best Evidence Rule
requires that the original be used as evidence, unless it is shown to be
unavailable due to no serious fault of the proponent of secondary evidence.
See FED. R. EviD. 1002, 1004 (codifying the Best Evidence Rule).
141. FED. R. EVID. 100 1(4) and 1003 provide as follows:
RULE 1001. DEFINITIONS
Winter 2004]
768 LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 38:739
lieu of originals when they are so voluminous that it is inconvenient
to use them in court, provided the originals were made available to
the opposing party for examination before trial.' 42 Because this is an
exception to the Best Evidence Rule, it was adopted with the intent
that the summaries would be used in lieu of the originals and would
be presented to the jury as a more convenient exhibit when used
during jury deliberations. 143 Nevertheless, many courts have chosen
to use summaries under this rule only as pedagogical devices that are
given no evidentiary status, and have not accepted them as
substitutes for the voluminous writings. Why did the Committee
choose not to address this issue? Once judges understand the value
and purpose of the summaries rule, they will probably find this tool
to be as helpful as they have found duplicates under Rules 1001(4)
and 1003, which are also admissible in lieu of originals. Perhaps
reeducating the bench vis-A-vis summaries under the Best Evidence
Rule is as abhorrent to the Committee as reeducating the members of
the Bar vis-A-vis the definition of hearsay without the assertive/non-
assertive distinction.
It is not acceptable for the Judicial Conference to continuously
use the excuses that revising the rules will disturb accepted practices
For purposes of this article the following definitions are applicable:
(4) Duplicate.-A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the
same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means
of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by
mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or
by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the
original.
RULE 1003. ADMISSIBILITY OF DUPLICATES.
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless
(1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or
(2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in
lieu of the original.
142. FED. R. EvID. 1006:
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs
which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in
the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The originals, or
duplicates, shall be made available for examination or copying, or
both, by other parties at reasonable time and place. The court may
order that they be produced in court.
143. FED. R. EvID. 1006 advisory committee's note.
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and expectations; that rule revision is not a big enough problem; that
courts are effectively handling rule revision; that revision efforts will
be too difficult; or the results will be too uncertain. Those arguments
could have been made when the Federal Rules of Evidence were
originally proposed, with the radical changes to the Best Evidence
Rule, the definition of hearsay, and the role of experts in trials. After
the Rules were adopted, their innovations should regularly have been
reassessed and either enhanced where proven effective, or abandoned
where proven faulty. Waiting until problems have caused significant
delays before taking action constitutes ineffective management by
crisis intervention. It increases the risk of doing too little too late
with inadequate understanding of the totality of the problems at
hand. 
14 4
b. Off-limit rules
The Advisory Committee's desire to avoid a confrontation with
Congress has led Committee members to take the position that it is
inappropriate for the Committee to revise Congressional additions to
the Evidence Rules that were added after the rules were initially
codified. 145 In other words, revisions that did not originate with the
Advisory Committee are not within its jurisdiction. This insistence
that there are two types of evidence rules within the code is, at best,
strange. Nothing in the Rules Enabling Act compels it. It appears to
be little more than excuse to avoid confrontation with Congress
arising from its ill considered prior enactments. This has led to
inaction in three instances-Rules 704(b), 413-15, and 301.
144. Besides, part of the Judicial Conference's responsibility is to make the
rules better, not just functional. Consequently, there should be ongoing
reassessments of every rule and the principles that underlie them-thinking
about everything "outside the box"--regardless of whether a proponent can
demonstrate that "serious" problems have been created.
145. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 301 (presumptions); FED. R. EVID. 413-415
(prior sexual assault evidence in sexual assault cases); FED. R. EvID. 704
(ultimate issue rules). Each is discussed below.
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i. Rule 704(b)
Congress passed the Hinkley Amendment to Rule 704146 after
the trial of John Hinkley for the shooting of President Reagan.
While in line with prior enactments, Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate
issue rule, the amendment states that "[n]o expert witness" can
testify as to whether a criminal defendant did or did not possess a
particular mental state at the time the crime was committed. 147 There
is an inconsistency, however: the last sentence of Rule 704 states
that "[s]uch ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone."
148
Does the last sentence expand the scope of the rule to all witnesses,
and not just expert witnesses, thereby precluding lay witnesses from
testifying to the apparent mental state of another? As long as the rule
is off limits, this matter will never be clarified by the Advisory
Committee. If it were not off limits, perhaps this entire politically
motivated amendment might be rescinded, because it accomplishes
virtually nothing other than to preclude testimony on the final
conclusions as to whether a particular state of mind existed at a
specific time. The psychiatric experts can still testify to mental
diseases, symptoms of those diseases, evidence of how advanced a
disease may be in a defendant, and conduct or mental states that
could result under conditions similar to those that existed at the time
of the charged crime. Following such testimony, what final
conclusion would have been offered, but for this provision, will be
patently obvious to those who have heard it. Consequently, jurors
must undoubtedly wonder why the examining lawyer did not ask the
expert whether that expert thought the defendant was insane, or had
the mental capacity to know right from wrong or could have
146. FED. R. EVID. 704 provides as follows: OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because
it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a
defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact
alone.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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conformed his conduct to the requirements of the law 14 9 at the time
the crime was committed.
Congress added this revision to Rule 704 because its members
thought the Hinkley trial, with its parade of psychiatric experts
testifying to contradictory conclusions, was a confusing spectacle
and a national embarrassment to be avoided. Unfortunately, the
amendment had virtually no effect on the parade of psychiatrists.
The same experts give the same testimony on the same mental states,
except for the final contradictory conclusions that they may have
reached.150 The only thing the amendment seems to have done is to
exclude the most helpful part of the psychiatrists' opinions, making
jurors wonder why the experts were not explicitly asked to state
conclusions that were implicit in their testimony.
ii. Rules 413-415
The politically motivated character provisions that Congress
added in Rules 413-415 provide another example of "off limits"
rules produced by bypassing the Rules Enabling Act process.151 The
Advisory Committee had rejected proposals for such rules from
members of Congress 152 for two reasons. First, there was insufficient
evidence that the rules were needed in federal courts where such
matters are rarely prosecuted, and generally only on Indian
reservations. 153 Second, the proponents could provide no empirical
evidence to establish that child sexual abuse offenses were so much
more predictive of future conduct than other types of offenses that
149. Any mental state that is an element of the crime charged or of a defense
thereto.
150. For example, the psychiatrist can testify to the defendant's condition, its
severity, and the impact that it could have on the defendant's mental state. The
psychiatrist, however, is not permitted to testify that in his or her opinion the
defendant did not understand the criminality of his conduct, or did not know
right from wrong (whatever the prevailing test may be), and therefore is
insane.
151. FED. R. EvID. 413 admits evidence of prior sexual assault offenses
committed by a criminal defendant. FED. R. EvID. 414 admits other instances
of child molestation in prosecutions for child molestation. Rule 415 admits
acts addressed in the previous rules in civil cases. FED. R. EVID. 415.
152. These were proposed to the Advisory Committee in 1994 and 1995 and
were rejected. See Minutes of Oct. 17-19, 1994, supra note 15.
153. Id.
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they deserved special evidentiary rules.' 54  Rule 404(b) was also
adequately handling this type of evidence.' 55  The rules were
consequently little more than a political statement about the
proponents' opposition to sexual offenders. Therefore, when the
proponents of these rules became part of the majority party in
Congress, they passed them outside the Rules Enabling Act process.
As previously discussed, 156 these new character evidence rules
direct the admission of this type of evidence in cases that fall within
their scope, with no explicit balancing of interests for unfair
prejudice. Since they are off limits, amending the rules to include
discretionary balancing has been left to the trial judges who are
responsible for applying them. Virtually all courts addressing the
issue have imposed such a balance,' 5 7 but the Advisory Committee
has continued to refuse to act.
iii. Rule 301
Before the rules of evidence were originally enacted, Congress
revised Rule 301.158 Under the original proposal sent to Congress,
the minority view of the effect of presumptions under the common
law-that they shifted the burden of persuasion to the party against
whom the presumptions-prevailed in lieu of the majority "bursting
bubble" theory. 159 The "bursting bubble" theory shifted only the
154. Id.
155. See Memorandum from The Evidence Project, to the Federal Rules of
Evidence Advisory Committee (Oct. 7, 1994) (submitted when Rules 413-415
were originally proposed) (on file with author); see, e.g., United States v.
Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988); David J. Kaloyanides, The
Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example of the Propensity for Aberrant
Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1297
(1992).
156. See discussion supra text accompanying note 94.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Larson, 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
158. "The bill passed by the House substituted a substantially different rule
in place of that prescribed by the Supreme Court. The Senate bill substituted
yet a further version, which was accepted by the House, was enacted by the
Congress, and is the [current] rule." FED. R. EvID. 301 Federal Judicial Center
note.
159. Proposed Rule 301 provided as follows: "In all cases not otherwise
provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules a presumption -imposes on
the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the
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burden of going forward with evidence. Congress changed the rule
back to the majority "bursting bubble" theory that had given rise to
all of the complexities surrounding presumptions under the common
law-the problems that the original drafters were attempting to
avoid. 6 0
This Congressional action has had significant implications for
presumptions that could accommodate the authentication problems
created by the advent of electronic commerce through e-mail.
Because the Advisory Committee has not touched Article III since its
enactment, the common law complexities have continued to grow
without clarification or direction. 16 1 In addition, no efforts have been
nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence." H.R.
Doc. No. 93-46, at 5 (1973).
160. See FED. R. EVID. 301:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act
of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.
161. For example, when a presumption has been met by the opposing party
with evidence of the non-existence of the presumed fact, under the "bursting
bubble" theory the presumption is supposed to burst like a bubble and
disappear. No instruction should be given to the jury about the presumption
because it has served its purpose and vanished. Despite the theory, courts
continue to mention the presumption to the jury after the bubble has burst,
calling it evidence, treating it like the logical inference that often gives rise to
the presumption, and requiring that a certain quantum of evidence be brought
forward to rebut the presumption. Alternatively, some courts dissatisfied with
the limited purpose assigned to the presumption instruct the jury that the
opposing party must disprove the fact presumed. They also appear to be
inclined to interpret statutory presumptions as burden of persuasion shifting
presumptions. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir.
1984) (stating that a presumption that a properly mailed letter was received can
be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence); N.L.R.B. v. Tahoe
Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1978) (concluding that the non-
statutory presumption in certain labor disputes shifted the burden of
persuasion); Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 599 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(shifting the burden of persuasion for a presumption that when an attorney
appears on behalf of a client, the attorney is authorized to do so). For a
discussion of these issues in the context of antitrust law, see Paul R. Rice &
Slade Cutter, Problems with Presumptions: A Case Study of the "Structural
Presumption" ofAnticompetitiveness, 2002 ANTITRUST 557.
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made to address the new and difficult issues arising with electronic
commerce.
The first of these new and difficult issues is whether any
common law presumptions have survived codification because none
were specifically recognized in Article III. Since the Supreme Court
has shown a tendency to employ the interpretation principle "if it
ain't there, it ain't there"'' 62 unless otherwise compelled by the logic
of the rule, 163 there is more than a possibility that the Court will
conclude that all common law presumptions have been silently
abolished.
If common law presumptions have survived codification despite
not having been delineated, the second issue is whether trial judges
retain the power to change them to accommodate the unique needs of
162. For example, in United States v. Bouraily, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the
Court concluded that the co-conspirator admission offered into evidence under
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) did not perpetuate the common law requirements that the
existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in the conspiracy
first be established with evidence independent of the content of the statement
in question. Id. at 176-77.This conclusion was reached because the rule only
codified the skeletal outlines of the common law rule. Because this
requirement was not explicit, the Court held that Congress had silently
overruled centuries of established precedent. Id. at 178.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588
(1993), the Court concluded that the failure to explicitly mention the standard
for admitting novel scientific evidence in Rule 702 or accompanying Advisory
Committee notes silently overruled decades of case law following the standard
of "general acceptance" in the relevant science established in United States v.
Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and followed throughout the federal
judicial system both before and after the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence (nearly twenty years of precedence under Rule 702). Daubert, 509
U.S. at 585.
Similarly, in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), the
Court held that prior act evidence introduced under Rule 404(b), did not perpe-
tuate the common law requirement that the commission of the act had to be
proven to the satisfaction of the presiding judge by clear and convincing
evidence before the evidence could be heard by the jury. Id. at 688. Because a
standard was not explicitly stated, the Court concluded that the evidence only
needed to be established by a preponderance of the evidence, and the ultimate
responsibility for making the determination was shifted to the jurors.
163. In Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), the Court held that a
prior consistent statement had to be made before a motive to fabricate arose to
be relevant to rehabilitate a witness who has been accused of recent
fabrication, improper influence, or motive. Even though this requirement was
not explicitly written into Rule 801(d)(1)(B), it was perceived as being a
logical imperative. Id. at 161-63.
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electronic communications. For example, the question exists
whether judges can change the reply doctrine created for messages
sent by mail to electronically transmitted messages sent by e-mail. If
courts possess the power to create new presumptions or to alter new
applications of old ones, then do trial judges also have the power to
shift the burden of persuasion under the newly created presumptions
when that is essential to their effectiveness?
How much longer must we wait for these issues to be
addressed? More importantly, why should the responsibility for
maintaining an additional Article of the evidence code-Article V,
Privileges-be codified and given to a quasi-legislative body that has
demonstrated neither the willingness nor the ability to effectively
manage the Rules that are currently in the code?
c. Minimal revisions-maintenance, not improvement
Throughout the years of its service, the Advisory Committee has
decided whether conflicts have existed and whether problems have
materialized based primarily upon reported decisions. This,
however, is like determining the size of an iceberg from what is
apparent on the water's surface. Since most evidentiary rulings are
never the subject of published judicial decisions because they are
rendered orally from the bench, the Committee's perceived need and
the actual need for action may be quite different. Since the Advisory
Committee does not regularly submit questionnaires to judges to
ascertain the true size and shape of icebergs, the need to act to curb
the effects of wrong-headed trends may not be apparent and they
may fail to take correct measures to avoid future problems. The fact
that a spectrum of organizations and practice backgrounds are
permitted to participate in the Committee process provides some
insurance against undetected problems. This protection, however, is
diminished by time constraints on members, the limited number of
issues brought before them by the gatekeepers of Committee
business, the limited voices that are heard before proposals are
published for public comment, 164 and the nature of the quasi-
164. In this regard, it is important to note that this article on the propriety of
codifying privilege rules, and the other articles addressing their content if
codification goes forward, have neither been sought nor sponsored by the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Judicial
Conference of the United States. Without the initiative of the Board of Editors
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legislative process itself, which is detached from the equities of
specific factual situations upon which actions must be taken.
What the Judicial Conference has not addressed by way of
ambiguities, inconsistencies, omissions, and ill-conceived ideas in
the Federal Rules of Evidence vastly overshadows its
accomplishments. These issues within the Evidence Code, many of
which were mentioned above, were surveyed in a Report published
by the Evidence Project at the American University Washington
College of Law. 165 This Report was submitted to the Evidence
Advisory Committee in 1997. It never saw the light of day,
however, and was not even brought to the attention of most of the
Committee members because it was summarily rejected by the
Committee's Reporter. 166  Subsequently, however, many of the
problems addressed in the Report were identified in a paper written
by the same Reporter. 167  Despite this exposure of issues and
problems that had been swept under the rug for the past quarter of a
century, little, if any, action has been taken to address and resolve
them.
It appears as though the Committee, in mentioning the many
problems identified within the Evidence Code, has been doing what
many of us did as children when we were served food that we did
not wish to eat (peas in my case): we acknowledged their existence
with our forks by spreading them around the plate, in an attempt to
hide them under remnants of other food, rather than eating them.
This ploy did not fool our parents and we should not be fooled now.
The fact that the Committee and its Reporter have pushed the peas
around its plate only confirms that the problems have been
recognized. It does not camouflage the fact that they are still on the
plate, and unconsumed. Unlike our childish conduct, however, this
demonstrates the Committee's conscious disregard for its broader
of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review these views likely would not have
been sought, expressed, or heard before a decision by the Advisory Committee
was made to go forward with specific provisions.
165. The Evidence Project, supra note 5.
166. Letters from Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to
Professor Paul R. Rice, (Dec. 23, 1996 & Nov. 14, 1997) (on file with author).
167. DANIEL J. CAPRA, CASE LAW DIVERGENCE FROM THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE (2000).
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responsibilities to the Code. This is not a process to which our
evidentiary privileges should be relegated.
Under the current Advisory Committee process, bad or
inadequate rules are often not addressed until the Advisory
Committee is either forced to do so because Congress is beginning to
act (as in the cases of Rules 702 and 703 and the expert opinion
rules) or is pressured by the judiciary to do so because judges are
ignoring the provisions the Committee has been charged with
maintaining. Rule 407 is the best example of the latter. The explicit
language of Rule 407 was limited to excluding evidence of such
measures only when offered to establish "negligence" or "culpable
conduct."' 168 The Judicial Conference did not get around to changing
the language to encompass product liability actions, however, where
negligence and culpability are not an issue until more than a decade
after the issue came to light. All federal circuits that had addressed
the issue had ignored the language of the rule and applied it to
product liability cases as well. Because of this type of intransigence,
the codified rules only retard the evolution of evidence doctrine. In
fairness to the current Advisory Committee, however, this occurred
during the time when the Chief Justice refused to create an Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. At the time, the
evidence rules were relegated to other Committees, the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
ignored them.
The refusal of the Judicial Conference to act to forestall
problems has compelled judicial actions that many conservatives
would criticize as judicial legislation. When those charged
maintaining the Code fail to fulfill their stewardship role, however,
this usurpation of legislative power is inevitable. Judges have the
principal responsibility to apply the rules of evidence in a fashion
that ensures justice in the resolution of disputes. That this quasi-
legislative process is driven by the exercise of power those judges
from whom the power was taken through codification demonstrates
that the process is clearly flawed. If judges were permitted to change
the rules as needed, and the Rules of Evidence were only advisory,
the current process would make sense. Under the existing structure,
168. FED. R. EvID. 407.
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however, it has come to resemble something akin to a Rube
Goldberg contraption, intentionally made far more complicated than
necessary to perform a simple task.
2. What Experience has Revealed About a Flawed Process
The inadequacies of this process vis-A-vis the common law case-
by-case evolutionary process it replaced may be attributable to a
number of factors. The first is its structure. The second is the
influence of special interests. The third is the inside game-the
interests and biases of those on the Committee. The fourth is the
Committee's tendency to mistake the forest for the trees, seeing and
addressing only surface issues detached from their context.
a. Structure of the Advisory Committee
All members of the Evidence Advisory Committee are
appointed by a single individual: the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. 169 This unfortunately and unnecessarily tends to give rise to
homogenous attitudes on a committee of individuals who are
obedient to the rule-making philosophies of a single individual. If
that philosophy is unsympathetic to proactive rule making, the
Committee becomes ineffective, and a hindrance to the evolution of
evidentiary principles. In a previous article, I proposed that
membership on this Committee be determined by the Chief Judge of
each Judicial Circuit.17 0 "Such a system would eliminate the undue
influence of a single person, while ensuring the interests, experiences
and problems of every circuit are voiced." 1
7 '
It was also suggested that the work of the Committee be more
transparent from beginning to end.' 72 Currently, the members of the
bench and bar are not consulted until the Committee has decided to
act, promulgated a proposed revision to a rule, affirmatively voted on
the change, and posted it for public comment.17 3 Why isn't the
169. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
170. Rice, supra note 5, at 831.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 831-32. As previously noted, see supra note 164, there has been
no solicitation of public comments from the Advisory Committee on whether
privilege rules should be codified.
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outside world engaged at the stage when it is being decided what
revisions will be attempted?
b. Special interest groups
The second reason the Advisory Committee process has been an
inadequate and largely ineffective method for maintaining the
evidence rules is that special interest groups have been introduced
into the rule-making process. Under the common law, evidence rules
evolved through case decisions and special interests were only heard
if given special permission to appear as amicus curiae. As a
consequence, the current process is too susceptible to the influence
of special interests. Under the common law, judges acted almost
exclusively on the basis of demonstrated need, rather than in
response to voiced desires and political pressure. The influence of
special interests is not only seen in deliberations over specific
revisions being proposed, but also in the decisions about which
"problem rules" to address.
The influence of special interests with respect to which rules the
Advisory Committee will give is particularly pernicious because it
means other more deserving problems will be ignored. Clearly, all
problems cannot be addressed at once. Needs are defined only as
traffic-stopping problems, however, and problems otherwise
addressed through judicial activism are ignored. This selection
process thus appears to have been strongly influenced by the
particular interests of the Committee's members, or by the power of
special interest groups. The latter type of power is demonstrated by
many years of attention given to Rule 412, which excludes evidence
of prior sexual activity of an assault victim (dubbed the "rape shield
law").'7 4 Since rape is not commonly prosecuted in federal courts,
something other than need generated this attention. It was, of course,
the lobbying efforts of women's groups and the political power they
wielded, either directly or indirectly, through Congress.
The special interests of members may have been reflected in the
revision to the co-conspirator admissions rule after the Supreme
Court held that in determining the admissibility of an alleged co-con-
spirator's admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the content of the
174. Id. at 820.
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statement in question could be considered with other evidence. 175
While no judge had held that the court could rely exclusively on the
content of the statement in question to determine its admissibility,
the rule was amended to explicitly preclude this. 17 6  Since no
problem existed, the Committee violated its own principle of "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it," and did so at the behest of someone with a
special interest. This, of course, demonstrated that the "fix when
broken" principle is generally employed as an excuse. It lets the
Committee ignore what is uninteresting, too politically sensitive, or
off limits because specifically enacted by Congress outside the Rules
Enabling Act. It allows the Committee to ignore what requires too
great a change in practice, or what requires too much study and time.
Our privilege jurisprudence should not be entrusted to a system that
employs its own rules arbitrarily and is disproportionately hindered
by the inaction of a few.
c. The inside game
A factor that inevitably influences the work of any organization
is the interests of those running it. What concerns them receives
attention. What does not, and ideas with which they do not agree,
are either ignored or are inadequately characterized and explained to
make them unattractive. This was true of a proposed revision to
Rule 703 put forth by the Evidence Project.
177
The Reporter developed an amendment to Rule 703 to address
the problem of the rule being "used as a 'back-door' hearsay
exception."' 178 The reporter's response was an addition to the rule
that would not permit the inadmissible basis of an expert's testimony
to be delineated by the proponent until it had been demonstrated that
the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed its
prejudicial effect-the reverse of the standard in Rule 403 for the
exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence. 179  This was the
amendment that eventually was adopted by the Committee. 180 A
competing proposal was made by an unidentified "public
175. See supra text accompanying note 101.
176. See supra text accompanying note 102.
177. The Evidence Project, supra note 5.
178. Minutes of Apr. 14-15, 1997, supra note 43.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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commentator"'l8 1 that attempted to bring the use of expert witnesses
in line with the principle that the exclusive finders of facts in a trial
to a jury are the jurors, not the expert witnesses. The expert's role is
solely to assist the jurors. This is why the common law considered
the testimony of the expert irrelevant to what a jury was being asked
to decide when the expert did not testify on the basis of the same
facts being considered by the jury.
This competing proposal would have required the rescission of
Rule 703 because this rule does just the opposite-it permits experts
to rely on inadmissible evidence if it is of the type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field. Under Rule 703, experts are
permitted to testify based on a different case from the one presented
to the jury. Since the jury is permitted to accept the expert's
conclusions for their truth which are premised on the truth of that
inadmissible evidence, however, the jurors are, in substance,
accepting the basis of the conclusions-and are doing so blindly-
when they are not permitted to hear that basis.
Acknowledging that experts are uniquely capable of "separating
the wheat from the chaff"'-assessing the reliability of facts that are
otherwise inadmissible-the competing proposal would have created
a hearsay exception for otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence
based on four factors: (1) the evidence was relied upon by experts
whose testimony the court determined to be admissible; (2) the
expert was particularly capable of assessing its reliability; (3) the
expert applied his or her expertise to the evidence in question and
made such an assessment; and (4) the expert was available to explain
why the evidence was found reliable.l 82 With such assurances of
181. Whether the origin of the proposal (The Evidence Project) was revealed
to the members of the Advisory Committee is not known. Perhaps the
Project's proposal was characterized as having come from a single "commen-
tator"-presumably myself as the Project's Director-because the existence of
The Evidence Project had not been brought to the attention of most members
of the Committee. This was discovered from personal telephone conversations
that I had with Committee members.
182. See PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE § 8.02 [B][8], at 1111-1129 (4th ed. 2000); Paul R. Rice, The Allure
of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires More Than
Redefining "Facts or Data", 47 MERCER L. REv. 495 (1996); Paul R. Rice,
Expert Testimony: A Debate Between Logic or Tradition Rather Than Between
Deference or Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1166 (1993); Paul R. Rice,
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reliability, the jury should hear the evidence and be permitted to use
it in the same way and for the same purpose as the expert.
Otherwise, the expert who is permitted to base his opinions on that
same evidence is being converted into a super-thirteenth jury
offering conclusions as afait accompli.1
83
Without this explanation of the competing proposal, it was
communicated to the members of the Advisory Committee as "[o]ne
public commentator proposed that Rule 703 should be amended to
prohibit the expert from relying on information not in evidence, and
that a new hearsay exception be added to permit reliable information
used by an expert to be admitted for its truth.' 84 The proposal was
rejected with no notice to the proponent, and no opportunity for the
proponent to explain and defend it, or to respond to the Committee
members' claims that it was "too narrow, because it only dealt with
hearsay information" and "too broad, because it could permit
dubious hearsay to be considered for its truth."'' 8
5
It is certainly true that experts often rely on more than in-
admissible hearsay when testifying on the basis of non-hearsay
evidence not personally known to them. Offered for its truth, it
would most certainly be hearsay in addition to whatever other char-
acteristics it may have had that otherwise made it inadmissible. The
objection that the competing proposal permitted "dubious hearsay" to
be considered is quite interesting. If evidence relied upon were
dubious, why would the expert have relied on it? Did her
qualifications not permit her to separate the "wheat from the chaff?"
Why were the expert's conclusions admissible when they had such a
"dubious" basis? As is occasionally true of criticisms by members of
the Advisory Committee, their objections to proposals are equally
applicable to their own proposals and reveal deficiencies in rules that
they fail to see or address.
As a result of the one-sided presentation by the sub-committee
exploring amendments to Rule 703, the Advisory Committee
ultimately (1) perpetuated the existing conflict between the role of
Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to
Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REv. 583 (1987).
183. See sources cited supra note 182.
184. Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Oct. 22,
1998, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/1098evidenceminutes.htm.
185. See id.
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the expert as a witness and the role of the jury as the finder of fact;
(2) failed to address the concern previously expressed in the
Advisory Committee that expert witness testimony was often used as
a "back-door" to get hearsay admitted; and (3) failed to establish
controls on when otherwise inadmissible evidence experts should
rely upon and reveal it in their testimony.
As previously noted, the assumption underlying Rule 703 is that
experts have the ability to separate the "wheat from the chaff." This
assumption is probably sound, but nowhere in the rule are the
proponents of expert witnesses required to demonstrate that the
experts applied their expertise to the otherwise inadmissible evidence
and assessed its reliability. It is just presumed that the experts have
done so. As a consequence, psychiatric experts could rely on
interviews with siblings because they are the "type" of evidence
psychiatrists generally rely upon, even though the interview may
have been conducted by a paralegal rather than a psychologist or
psychiatrist. When the rule speaks of the "type reasonably relied
upon,, 186 is a generic type sufficient? It shouldn't be, because how
evidence is acquired often directly impacts its reliability. This has
been true, for example, with statements taken from children alleged
to be victims of sexual abuse. Neither the rule nor the accompanying
Advisory Committee Notes mention this aspect of its application. As
a consequence, it is questionable whether judges consistently require
proponents of expert witnesses to demonstrate that their expertise has
been specifically applied to the evidence in question to assess its
reliability.
d. Mistaking the trees for the forest
In its effort to provide guidance through the rules, the
Committee has decided that "minimal departure[s] from the existing
language" are preferable because they ensure that "important
precedent construing well-established language might [not] be
lost."'187 While this approach has merit in some circumstances, it can
be used as an excuse to not address fundamental problems and to
fight the current of contemporary practice. If one is too concerned
about preserving existing practice, the inadequacies of that practice
186. FED. R. EvID. 703.
187. Minutes ofApr. 6-7, 1998, supra note 47.
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can easily be overlooked. This appears to be what occurred with the-
Advisory Committee's revisions to Rule 702.
There has been confusion and disagreement about the meaning
and scope of the Daubert decision, in which the Court found that the
standard for screening scientific evidence had been changed without
comment in the Evidence Code. 188  In response, the Committee
instructed a subcommittee to study the problem and provide models
for "general standards that would guide a trial court in determining
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable."' 89  The
subcommittee created a test that reflected the language of the opinion
they were trying to "refine." To determine the reliability of scientific
testimony, the Committee devised a three prong tautology-
employing the very term they were supposed to assist judges to
understand: 1) that there was a sufficient basis; (2) that reliable
principles and methods were employed; and (3) that those principles
and methods were reliably employed.
To preserve the trees in front of them, they ignored the forest of
reliability. What standard of "reliability" must the judge ensure has
been met? Is it the scientific standard of reliability-which in some
cases may be 95% or higher:because science is pursuing scientific
truths with the use of principles-or something less? Since courts
resolve social disputes by a preponderance of the evidence, and use
the scientific evidence in conjunction with other evidence, why
should the standard of reliability have to be higher than for any other
type of evidence? If the persuasive value of scientific evidence
compels a higher standard of reliability for use, what standard is
appropriate and how should it be determined? Judges and lawyers
188. For example, because Daubert dealt only with the screening of
scientific evidence, courts initially circumvented the gate-keeping role it
outlined by characterizing the evidence as "technological" rather than
"scientific." See, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th
Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court stopped this in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999), where it held that both types of evidence had to be
screened for reliability. Beyond science and technology, what additional
evidence has to go through the Daubert screening process? The language of
Rule 702 that the Court was interpreting in both Daubert and Kumho Tire is
"[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact," what "specialized knowledge" is going to be pulled into this time-
consuming screening process? FED. R. EVID. 702.
189. Minutes of Oct. 20-21, 1997, supra note 44.
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need thoughtful direction, not mere repetition of that about which
they need direction.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
JURISPRUDENCE UNDER COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES SINCE THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
How would the attorney-client privilege have fared under a
codified system managed through the Advisory Committee process?
The answer, of course, cannot be predicted with certainty. The
demonstrated deficiencies of the Advisory Committee process
suggest, however, that codification should be approached with
caution. A comparison of the pace and quality of the evolution of the
codified rules to the evolution of privileges left to develop under the
common law principles, interpreted by judges on a case-by-case
basis, strongly suggests that the evolution of privileges would have
been significantly restrained by codification. This is demonstrated by
a brief examination of the evolution of a few elements of what is
perhaps among the most commonly raised privileges-the attorney-
client privilege.
When legal assistance of any kind is sought from a professional
legal advisor in his capacity as such, the attorney-client privilege
protects from disclosure: "[C]ommunications relating to that
purpose... made in confidence... by [a] client [or by the attorney
in a responsive communication that reveals the content of the client's
prior communications], [unless] the protection [is] waived."
190 The
following are only a few of the areas that have experienced
significant change since the drafting of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the early 1970s.
A. Client
In the corporate world the client is a fictitious legal 
entity.191
Courts have held that only the board of directors, corporate officers,
and employees speaking about matters within the scope of their
190. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mut. Reinsurance Bureau, 150 F.R.D. 193,
196 n.4 (D. Kan. 1993).
191. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981)
(referring to a corporation as "an artificial creature of the law").
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employment responsibilities personify the corporate client. 192 The
privilege only protects their communications with corporate counsel.
Originally, only these individuals could be privy to confidential
attorney-client communications without waiving the privilege
protection. As the strict enforcement of the confidentiality
requirement has been relaxed, 193 however, the courts have accepted a
broader circle of confidentiality vis-A-vis who personifies the
corporate entity. Over the past half century, courts have also
accepted former employees,' 94  and more recently, outside
consultants 195 into the circle of confidentiality.
192. While the Court in Upjohn rejected the "control group" test for
determining who personifies the corporate entity for attorney-client privilege
purposes, it did not explicitly adopt the alternative "subject matter" test. The"control group" test limited the scope of the corporate privilege to
communications between corporate legal counsel and individuals within the
corporate structure who were "in a position to control or even take a substantial
part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the
advice of the attorney." City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210
F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The "subject matter" test extended the
privilege protection to all corporate employees who speak to legal counsel
about matters within the scope of their corporate responsibilities. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970). The
Upjohn opinion, however, relied upon many of the same factors in concluding
that the privilege was applicable than it would have had the "subject matter"
test been adopted. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394; see John E. Sexton, A Post-
Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 443 (1982). See generally RICE, supra note 3, § 4:14 (discussing the"subject matter" test as an alternative to the more restrictive "control group"
test).
193. See discussion infra in text beginning at notes 223-235.
194. See In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 606 (4th Cir. 1997); Admiral Ins. Co. v.
United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1989); In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d
1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981); Miramar Constr. Co. v. Home Depot, Inc., 167
F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 (D.P.R. 2001); Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien Biao Bank
Tanz. Ltd., No. 95 ClV. 4856 (SS), 1996 WL 490,710, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
27, 1996); Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 124 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Stabilus, Div. of Fichtel & Sachs Indus., Inc. v. Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson
& Greaves, No. 91-6184, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4980, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
31, 1992); Command Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line (U.S.A.) Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94,
96 (D. Mass. 1987).
195. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994). The outside
consultant was intimately involved on a daily basis in the client's attempts to
succeed in a business venture. "[H]e was in all relevant respects the functional
equivalent of an employee." Id.; In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200
F.R.D. 213, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (outside public relations firm); Village of
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Shareholders, though they own the corporation, do not personify
it. They can therefore be denied access to confidential corporate
communications, because their interference could disrupt corporate
activities. Nevertheless, in Garner v. Wolfinbarger,196 the court held
that corporate shareholders could gain access to those
communications when they demonstrated good cause. The theory
driving the decision was the fiduciary duty that corporate counsel
owes the shareholders.' 97  That decision has subsequently been
Kiryas Joel Local Dev. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 90 Civ. 4970 (JFK),
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 405, at *10-*11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1992). In Kiryas
Joel, an outside insurance specialist assisted a corporate employee in seeking
legal advice. Id. Communications at the meetings where he was present were
held protected by the attorney-client privilege because the corporation had
every reason to believe he was assisting in obtaining legal services and
reasonably expected that the outside consultants would not disclose the
substance of those communications. Id.
196. 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970).
197. The Garner Court explained:
It is urged that disclosure is injurious to both the corporation and
the attorney. Corporate management must manage. It has the duty to
do so and requires the tools to do so. Part of the managerial task is to
seek legal counsel when desirable, and, obviously, management
prefers that it confer with counsel without the risk of having the
communications revealed at the instance of one or more dissatisfied
stockholders. The managerial preference is a rational one, because it
is difficult to envision the management of any sizeable corporation
pleasing all of its stockholders all of the time, and management desires
protection from those who might second-guess or even harass in
matters purely ofjudgment.
But in assessing management assertions of injury to the corporation
it must be borne in mind that management does not manage for itself
and that the beneficiaries of its action are the stockholders.
Conceptualistic phrases describing the corporation as an entity
separate from its stockholders are not useful tools of analysis. They
serve only to obscure the fact that management has duties which run to
the benefit ultimately of the stockholders. For example, it is difficult
to rationally defend the assertion of the privilege if all, or substantially
all, stockholders desire to inquire into the attorney's communications
with corporate representatives who have only nominal ownership
interests, or even none at all. There may be reasonable differences
over the manner of characterizing in legal terminology the duties of
management, and over the extent to which corporate management is
less of a fiduciary than the common law trustee. There may be many
situations in which the corporate entity or its management, or both,
have interests adverse to those of some or all stockholders. But when
all is said and done management is not managing for itself.
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expanded to myriad situations where fiduciary duties have been
found. 198  Would this expansion of the privilege's circle of con-
fidentiality have occurred under a codified rule of privilege under
which such an expansion was not explicitly sanctioned? Would the
Committee have responded favorably to proposed expansions of the
privilege in this fashion, or done nothing because things were "work-
ing well under an extensively developed case law"? 199 The track
record of the Committee suggests it would not have responded. The
experience of the state of California, where privilege has been
codified, suggests judicial expansion would have been unlikely as
well.
In Dickerson v. Superior Court,20 0 for example, a California
court was asked to recognize the federal fiduciary duty exception
even though it was not recognized in California's evidence code.
While acknowledging the wisdom of this widely recognized federal
exception, the court declined to incorporate the exception into
California law because, unlike federal courts, California courts were
no longer free to recognize new privilege doctrines.
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence encouraged the
Garner court, on the other hand, to create this new exception.20 ,
Rule 501provides that the rules of privilege "shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
The representative and the represented have a mutuality of interest
in the representative's freely seeking advice when needed and putting
it to use when received. This is not to say that management does not
have allowable judgment in putting advice to use. But management
judgment must stand on its merits, not behind an ironclad veil of
secrecy which under all circumstances preserves it from being
questioned by those for whom it is, at least in part, exercised.
Id. at 1101 (citation omitted).
198. Garner was a shareholder derivative action. Id. at 1095. Initially, the
decision was expanded to non-derivative actions. Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d
126, 130 (6th Cir. 1992); Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 786
(5th Cir. 1988); Burghart v. Landau; No. 82 Civ. 2181 (MJL), 1985 WL 209, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1985); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 484 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1978); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361, 367-68 (D. Del.
1975); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
Thereafter, the fiduciary duty exception was expanded beyond shareholder
suits. For an exploration of those situations, see RICE, supra note 3, § 8:23.
199. Minutes of Apr. 14-15, 1997, supra note 43.
200. 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (Ct. App. 1982).
201. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1098.
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
20 2
This rule provides federal courts 'with the flexibility to develop
rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."' 20 3 The California courts,
however, are not free to create new privileges as a matter of judicial
policy and must apply only those which have been created by
statute.
20 4
Would federal courts have responded in the same fashion as the
California Courts have? The answer cannot be known. It is clear,
however, that without the explicit freedom given to courts under
Rule 501, some would not have exercised the common law authority
taken from them through codification. The result, of course, would
be that our privilege jurisprudence would be less advanced than it is
today. If the Advisory Committee's answer to this problem is to give
courts freedom to interpret and modify all codified privileges, what
remains to be gained by codification?
B. Agent of Attorney
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
certain individuals whose assistance was necessary to the attorney's
rendering of legal services were permitted to be privy to confidential
attorney-client communications . 0 5  These individuals could also
communicate directly with the client and the communications were
privileged to the same extent as they would have been had the agent
been the attorney. Throughout the past half century courts have
increasingly permitted anyone who assists an attorney in rendering
legal advice or assistance to a client to be privy to confidential
attorney-client communications, so long as the individual agent is
under the attorney's direct supervision.
206
202. FED. R. EvID. 501.
203. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (quoting 120 CONG.
REC. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate)).
204. Dickerson, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 100. This lack of power has continued to
restrict the power of courts to either expand the privilege or recognize implied
exceptions. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court, 990 P.2d 591, 594 (Cal.
2000); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1236
(2004) ("In California, the attorney-client privilege is a legislative creation.
The courts of this state have no power to expand it or to recognize implied
exceptions." (citation omitted)).
205. See RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note 3, § 3:3.
206. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 220 F.3d 568, 571 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that when law firms hire accountants to assist in the representation
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Over time the necessity standard proved unrealistic. This is
because typing skills working on word processors and researching
via the Internet, many administrative assistants who had helped
attorneys with chores such as typing became increasingly
nonessential. Many assistants, who were essential to the lawyer in
past generations, and therefore privy to confidential communications,
were technically no longer necessary.
Nevertheless, both lawyers and judges have implicitly
understood that lawyers must be able to provide legal advice and
assistance in the most cost-efficient and effective manner possible.
Attorneys must be able to use whomever they feel could be helpful
without worrying about the necessity of the assistant for purposes of
the attorney-client privilege. While courts still mouth the necessity
standard, it is no longer rigorously enforced, if for no other reason
than because questions are seldom asked and objections are seldom
made about the roles of a lawyer's assistant.
of the client, the privileged communications shared with those accountants
remain privileged as long as that information was given to the attorney for the
sole purpose of seeking legal advice); Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v.
Wachner, 124 F. Supp. 2d 207, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (an investment banker
was privy to confidential communications between the attorney and client
because his services were helpful in drafting a document requiring an
understanding of what was "material" from a business person's perspective);
Ramseur v. Reich, No. CIV.A. 2:95-0382, 1997 WL 907,896, at *9 (S.D.W.V.
Mar. 31, 1997) (finding dispositive of the question of the attorney-client
privilege communications between an agent and the client, the attorney's
statement that he "was working with me in my office on this instant case;" not
inquiring into the need for the assistance); United States v. Beck, No. 86-315,
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,
.988, at *21 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 14, 1989) (accountant worked at the direction, and
pursuant to the instructions, of the attorney); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121
F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[T]he weight of authority holds that the
privilege applies to confidential communications with patent agents acting
under the authority and control of counsel."); Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., No. 84 C 5103, 1987 WL 12,919, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 19, 1987)
(requiring that agents be under "the direct supervision of the attorney" in order
to be protected by the privilege); United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420,
425 (N.D. I11. 1972) ("There appear to be two key factors in determining
whether the attorney-client privilege is applicable to the workpapers of an
accountant. First, has the attorney been retained by the taxpayer prior to the
preparation of the workpapers and reports by the accountant? Second, have the
workpapers and reports been prepared by the accountant at the direction of the
attorney?").
BACK TO THE FUTURE
Courts continue to actively inquire into necessity only when the
lawyer hires, as his "agent," an individual who otherwise would have
provided direct assistance to the client, thereby making the agent's
work discoverable. This issue has arisen most often with
accountants hired by the attorney to do what they likely would have
done for the client without the attorney's involvement. Attempts by
attorneys to manipulate the privilege for a client's unfair advantage
have not gone unchallenged. If a necessity standard had been part
of a codified rule, would courts have been equally willing to roll with
the technological changes and relax the necessity requirement to
facilitate efficient legal services? Would the Committee have waited
until the courts took the lead and only then followed with
codification? Would the matter have been ignored, or, if raised,
tabled because it was "adequately being handled"?
In the corporate world the issue currently developing is the use
of paralegals who perform services previously performed by licensed
attorneys. If the corporation's legal department hires and trains a
paralegal to perform a specific task such as drafting particular
contract provisions, will the paralegal's communications with
corporate employees about legal matters within the scope of their
responsibilities be privileged, regardless of whether there is
207. See United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963) ("The
accountants' role was to facilitate an accurate and complete consultation
between the client and the attorney about the former's financial picture.
The... documents constituted confidential communications within the attor-
ney-client privilege."); Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 58-59
(D. Mass. 2001) (holding that communications to, from, or in the presence of
those accountants were not protected by the attorney-client privilege where a
party was represented by an accounting firm and not by lawyers, where the
accounting firm was not retained by any of the lawyers representing other
parties who shared a common interest, and where the accountants were third
parties whose presence breached the confidentiality of the privilege); Gerrits v.
Brannen Banks of Fla., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 574, 577 (D. Colo. 1991) ("Although
the attorney-client privilege may sometimes extend to communications to
accountants or other experts providing assistance to an attorney, the
communication must be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice from the lawyer. If what is sought is not legal advice but only
professional service, or if the advice sought is the professional's rather than the
lawyer's, no privilege exists."); United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420,
425-26 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (holding no privilege applied to taxpayer reports, even
where the attorney was hired before the accountant prepared the reports, and
reports were prepared at the direction of the attorney).
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immediate supervision or use of the communications by a licensed
lawyer? This issue has not been addressed in any codification of the
privilege in any state or federal jurisdiction and there is a limited
number of reported decisions on the subject.2 °8 What do courts look
to for guidance in jurisdictions where the privilege is codified? If the
answer is common law principles interpreted in light of reason and
experience, what would be gained by codification, particularly if the
Advisory Committee never gets around to addressing issues like this
because they can adequately be addressed by judges on a case-by-
case basis?
C. Communication
The privilege applies to communications, not information.20 9
Therefore, when information in prior communications with legal
counsel is disclosed, this does not reveal the fact that the prior
confidential communications to the lawyer contained those facts.
Therefore, the disclosure does not waive the privilege protection for
those prior attorney-client communications.
Many courts, however, fail to understand or properly apply the
distinction between communications and information. For example,
when documents are being prepared for public filing, drafts ex-
changed between the attorney and the client are privileged until the
client approves the final draft. That authorization to file waives the
privilege for only the final draft.2t ° Many courts, however, have
erroneously held that the filing of the papers waives the privilege for
208. See, e.g., HPD Labs., Inc. v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410, 417 (D.N.J.
2001). "A non-lawyer's statements do not automatically become privileged
simply because, at some point, that person interacted with or learned from an
attorney." Id. Otherwise, the court explained, it would "give in-house counsel
a strategic incentive to impart basic legal knowledge to corporate employees
and then, during litigation, claim that statements made by those employees in
the regular course of business are protected because they build on or derive
from counsel's teachings in some manner." Id.
209. See RICE, supra note 3, § 5:1.
210. Muncy v. City of Dallas, No. CIV.A.3:99-CV-2960-P, 2001 WL
1,795,591, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2001); United States v. Newell, 192
F.R.D. 587, 588-89 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel
Corp., No. 89-5940, 1991 WL 61,144, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1991). See
generally RICE, supra note 3, ch. 12 (providing an overview of choice of law,
particularly as it relates to attorney-client privilege and Rule 501).
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the previous drafts as well.2 11 Because this practice is so widespread,
would the Committee have been willing to amend a codified rule to
explicitly clarify this, or would it have ignored the error because
things are "working well under an extensively developed [albeit
wrong] case law," or because the problem has not been demonstrated
to be substantial enough?
The interpretation of the definition of the privilege has changed
over the past thirty years. While the privilege still protects the
confidential communications of the client with the attorney for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance, the derivative theory
for responsive attorney communications to the client has evolved in
many state and federal courts. This has been due, in large part, to the
paraphrasing of the definition of the privilege as protecting
"communications between the attorney and client." 212 This definition
has prompted many courts to declare that the privilege affords a
direct protection to the communications of the attorney regardless of
whether they reveal prior client confidences. 213 The Supreme Court
211. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 354-55 (4th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976); Heidelberg Harris,
Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 95 C 0673, 1996 WL 732,522, at
*11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1996); Howes v. Med. Components Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1511, 1512 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Willis, 565 F. Supp. 1186,
1207 (S.D. Iowa 1983).
212. The originally proposed attorney-client privilege rule, Proposed Rule
503, referred to the protection in this fashion. H.R. Doc. No. 93-46, at 10
(1973).
213. While some of these have been blanket statements, see In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Biermean), 765 F.2d 1014, 1018 (11th Cir. 1985)
("Communications between an attorney and his client made for the purpose of
securing legal advice are protected under the attorney-client privilege."), most
of the cases giving a direct protection have involved the attorneys' opinions.
See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (asserting
that a lawyer's estimate of a client's damages would be privileged because it
would reflect the "lawyer's professional assessment;" the court did not
mention whether the assessment had to reveal the confidential communications
of the client, but this may have been assumed since the assessment was
premised on the truth of what the client said); United States v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Legal advice or opinion from an
attorney to his client, individual or corporate, has consistently been held by the
federal courts to be within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Two
reasons have been advanced in support of the two-way application of the
privilege. The first is the necessity of preventing the use of an attorney's
advice to support inferences as to the content of confidential communications
by the client to the attorney. The second is that, independent of the content of
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has added to this confusion by announcing in Upjohn Co. v. United
States2 14 that the "privilege exists to protect not only the giving of
professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed
advice." 215 Under the prevailing derivative theory, the Court got it
backwards! The privilege protects communications from the client
to the attorney and also the responsive communications from the
attorney to the client until the client reveals the substance of prior
confidential communications. Would the Committee revise the rule
to reflect the language of the Supreme Court, as it did in its revisions
to Rule 702 relative to the admissibility of the expert opinions, or
would it be true to the theory of the privilege and correct the
Supreme Court's misstatement and lower courts' erroneous
practices?
This distinction that many courts are making between advice
and other attorney communications has led to skewed decisions
about what constitutes "advice." In United States v. Bauer,21 6 for
any client communication, legal advice given to the client should remain confi-
dential. To the extent that the trial court predicated its ruling on the general
inapplicability of the privilege to communications from the attorney to the
client we disapprove of it." (citations omitted)); Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV
Broad. Corp., No. 01 C 4366, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13,816, at *9-*10 (N.D.
I11. Aug. 7, 2003) (holding that draft agreements containing notes from the
attorney were protected because they were rendering legal advice); Segerstrom
v. United States, No. C 00-0833 SI, 2001 WL 283,805, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6,
2001) ("The privilege extends to cover both the substance of the client's
confidential communications and the attorney's advice in response thereto. All
other communications from the attorney to the client are protected if the
attorney's communications would reveal confidential client communications."
(citations omitted)); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 193 F.R.D.
530, 538 (N.D. Ill. 2000) ("Next, we note that several documents are described
as agendas for meetings, many of which are authored by attorneys. Such a
description makes it very unlikely that legal advice is implicated, nor would
such documents ordinarily be expected to reveal confidential communications.
These documents must be produced."), aff'd, 2000 WL 1,310,669 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 13, 2000); Maher v. Monahan, No. 98Civ.2319 (JGK)(MHD), 2000 WL
777,877, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2000) ("All of these documents describe
communications between attorneys and Lt. Zorpoli, and all reflect attorney
advice, thus placing the communications squarely within the ambit of the
privilege. The communications in question involve the rendering of legal
advice and are therefore presumptively privileged.") (citation omitted).
214. 449 U.S. 383 (1891).
215. Id. at 390.
216. 132 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1997).
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example, the Court held that the attorney-client privilege was
violated when a former bankruptcy attorney was required to reveal
that he had advised Bauer about his obligation to disclose assets that
Bauer was charged with fraudulently failing to report in his petition.
Bauer, of course, claimed that he had innocently withheld infor-
mation about certain assets believing that they did not have to be
reported.2 17 The Court held that the prosecutor could not rely on the
defendant's prior attorney to establish his knowledge, and therefore
his perjury.2
8
The trial judge required the bankruptcy attorney's disclosure on
the belief that when attorneys advise clients about the rules of the
court, they are not acting as an attorney, but as officers of the court
conveying public information.2 19 This decision was influenced by a
well-established body of law holding that when an attorney notifies a
client of the dates on which the court has ordered the client to appear
for sentencing, the client can have no reasonable expectation that
such communications are confidential.22 ° Consequently, the attorney
217. Id. at 510.
218. Id. at 509, 512.
219. Id. at 508.
220. Id.; see also, Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 110 (6th Cir.
1995) ("[A]n attorney's message to his client concerning the date and time of
court proceedings is not a privileged communication."); United States v.
Franke, No. 94-3062, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11,307, at *8-*12 (10th Cir.
May 16, 1995) (unpublished) ("At trial the government introduced the
testimony of Carl Cornwell, an attorney who had formerly represented Franke
on the mail fraud charges. Cornwell testified that two previous trial settings in
the mail fraud case had been continued on his application due to conflicts with
Cornwell's other trial settings in unrelated matters. Most significantly,
Cornwell testified that he informed Franke that trial was scheduled for August
31, that Franke had requested that Cornwell again attempt to obtain a
continuance, and that Cornwell had advised Franke that he would not seek
another continuance because, in his opinion, there were no valid grounds for
seeking further delay .... Franke's contention in the instant case invokes
th[e] ... confidential communication exception. The facts, however, do not
support application of this principle to the testimony at issue. Franke argues
that disclosure of the lawyer's communication regarding the time of trial and
the lawyer's rejection of Franke's request to seek another continuance was in
substance a disclosure of confidential communications, namely the existence
of a dispute between Franke and his attorney regarding the attorney's
preparedness and the 'proper tactical method to employ regarding scheduling.'
We do not agree that the attorney's testimony can be equated with disclosure
of confidential communications. All that was material to the offense charged
was the attorney's testimony that the time of trial had been communicated to
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can be required to reveal that the client was advised of the
appearance date when the client is later tried for failing to appear.
The same result obtains in ascertaining when a client received a
deficiency notice from the IRS so as to establish the time from which
a petition for review should have been filed.22'
Without explaining why informing a client of where and when
the law, represented in an order by the presiding judge or a notice of
deficiency from the IRS, requires the client to personally appear is
not legal assistance protected by the privilege, the court held that
Franke and that Franke had been advised that no continuance would be
requested. These communications were not privileged." (citation omitted));
United States v. Posin, 996 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) (requiring
an attorney to appear before grand jury and disclose whether he informed
client of sentencing date); United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir.
1989) (allowing an attorney to testify that he informed client of sentencing date
finding that communication of trial date was not confidential); McKay v.
Comm'r, 886 F.2d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing an attorney to testify
that he sent IRS deficiency notice to client); United States v. Clemons, 676
F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1982) ("An attorney's message to his client concerning
the date of trial is not a privileged communication."); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, Des Moines, Iowa, 568 F.2d 555, 557 (8th Cir. 1977)
("Communications by a defense counsel to the client or by a client to the
defense counsel regarding the time and place of trial are not confidential and
therefore are not protected by the attorney-client privilege."), cert. denied sub
nom., Black Horse v. United States, 435 U.S. 999 (1978); United States v.
Uptain, 552 F.2d 1108, 1109 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that an attorney's
notification to client of the trial date was not privileged communication);
United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 68 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the
attorney's advising client of court order to appear was not protected); United
States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69, 74 (10th Cir. 1969) ("Relating such notice
[that the client must be present at the trial] to the client was counsel's duty as
an officer of the court, and was not within the privilege."); United States v.
Hall, 346 F.2d 875, 882 (2d Cir. 1965) ("We find no invasion of the attorney-
client privilege resulting from [the lawyer's] formal testimony that he
conveyed to his client the Assistant United States Attorney's routine message
that the accused's presence was required at each calendar call. The relaying of
this message is not in the nature of a confidential communication. Defense
counsel served merely as a conduit for transmission of a message." (citations
omitted)); United States v. Franke, Crim.A. No. 92-20029-01, 1994 WL
68513, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 1994) (holding that an attorney's
communication of a trial date was not a confidential communication protected
by the privilege); United States v. Woodruff, 383 F. Supp. 696, 698 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (holding that an attorney's communication to the client of the time and
date of the trial was not privileged).
221. McKay, 886 F.2d at 1238 (holding that an attorney could testify that he
sent an IRS deficiency notice to the client).
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informing the client of where and when the law, represented in an act
of Congress, requires that a client's assets appear is legal advice that
is privileged.22  This decision was a product of the
recharacterization of the attorney-client privilege as protecting
communications "between" the attorney and client-affording a
direct protection to all responsive attorney communications.
Under the classical derivative theory for responsive attorney
communications, this attorney's communication about the abstract
requirements of the law would not have been privileged because it
did not apply or interpret those principles in light of the client's
unique circumstances, and thus did not reveal prior privileged client
communications. This also would be true regardless of whether the
attorney's communications were characterized as "legal advice" or as
the "transmission of public information."
223
Some courts have interpreted the federal attorney-client
privilege to embrace virtually everything that transpires between the
attorney and the client-even the communication of information that
the attorney has acquired from third parties.224 This is not federal
law. 225
222. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981).
223. While the transmission of information about the law could reasonably
be interpreted as "legal assistance," unless that "assistance" involved the
application of the legal principles to the unique facts communicated by the
client in a way that reveals that he had communicated those facts, there was no
basis for extending the privilege protection.
224. Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997)
("[S]ome courts have held that the privilege protects communications from the
lawyer, regardless of whether the lawyer's communications reveal confidences
from the client .... This broader approach has been applied in cases holding
that any communication from an attorney to his client made in the course of
giving legal advice is protected. The LTV opinion rejects the narrower view,
pointing out that the predictability of confidence is central to the role of the
attorney and that 'adoption of such a niggardly rule has little to justify it and
carries too great a price tag.' The LTV opinion concludes that a broader rule
prevails in the federal courts, one that protects from forced disclosure any
communication from an attorney to his client when made in the course of
giving legal advice .... " (citations omitted). The court followed the LTV
precedent.); United States v. Mobil Corp., 149 F.R.D. 533, 536 (N.D. Tex.
1993) ("The attorney-client privilege protects two related, but different,
communications: (1) confidential communications made by a client to his
lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; and (2) any communication
from an attorney to his client when made in the course of giving legal advice,
whether or not that advice is based on privileged communications from the
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Why are federal courts distorting the privilege in this fashion?
Do they not understand it, or are they being influenced by
perceptions of the privilege in the state jurisdictions where they sit,
and where the judges perhaps practiced before being appointed to the
bench? If the latter is true, it would be equivalent to the practice in
federal courts prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
when federal courts generally followed the evidence rules of the state
jurisdictions in which they sat. Perhaps that is not such a bad idea
for the attorney-client privilege, since lawyers generally have to be
licensed under state law, and both they and their clients operate
under the assumption that state rules control the confidentiality of
client."); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 602-03 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("In
theory, the client states facts and the attorney gives advice; and in theory, if the
advice to the client does not reveal what the client told him it is not privileged
.... Whatever the conceptual purity of this 'rule,' it fails to deal with the
reality that lifting the cover from the advice will seldom leave covered the
client's communication to his lawyer. Nor does it recognize the independent
fact gathering role of the attorney. Finally, enforcement of the rule would be
imprecise at best, leading to uncertainty as to when the privilege will apply
.... A broader rule.., protects from forced disclosure any communication
from an attorney to his client when made in the course of giving legal advice
.... [W]e think the broader rule better serves the interests underlying the
attorney-client privilege and is not inconsistent with the principle that the
attorney-client privilege should be construed narrowly."). See generally, Paul
R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney
Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents and the Source of the Facts
Communicated, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 967, 970-79 (1999) (recognizing that
confusion exists as to the fundamental principles of the attorney-client
privilege, partly due to a misunderstanding over the distinction between
communication and information).
225. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); TVT Records v. Island
Def Jam Music Group, 214 F.R.D. 143, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]he
communication is not privileged to the extent it merely relays the content of
the attorney's conversation with a third party."); Gucci Am., Inc. v.
Loehmann's Inc., No. 01 CIV.3904 MBM MHD, 2002 WL 1,467,851, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2002) ("[T]he privilege-whether interpreted broadly or
narrowly-does not protect a communication from the attorney to the client
that simply reports the receipt of information from someone not a party to the
privileged relationship."); Boling v. First Util. Dist., No. 3:97-CV-832, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21157, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 1998) ("On the other hand,
correspondence from counsel to plaintiff which is based on information
learned from any person outside the plaintiffs organization is not
privileged.").
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their relationships. 226  Does the Committee intend to upset this
applecart for the sake of consistency and thereby "upset settled
expectations"? Without codification, perhaps choice of law prin-
ciples will evolve vis-A-vis the attorney-client privilege so that state
law will usually be followed in federal courts, since this is the only
law that attorneys and clients can reasonably anticipate will control
communications that are encouraged by the privilege. These
principles are usually established before suits-the triggering
mechanisms for applying federal law-are filed in federal court.
22 7
D. Confidentiality
Previously the confidentiality requirement was an absolute
necessity for the creation and continuation of the attorney-client
privilege. It has evolved from requiring strict secrecy at the point of
the privilege's creation into little more than a condition precedent to
the creation of the privilege, but not necessary to its continuation.
228
It has been treated as little more than a right of privacy that can be
shared, within certain limitations. Most notably, courts have as a
result (1) continued to recognize the privilege even though
confidentiality has been destroyed by the intentional acts of third
parties (such as stealing documents) 229 and (2) recognized the con-
226. For a discussion of choice of law questions vis-A-vis the attorney-client
privilege, see RICE, supra note 3, ch. 12.
227. FED. R. EviD. 501 provides in part "in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law."
See generally RICE, supra note 3, § 12:6 (discussing Rule 501 and choice of
law on privilege).
228. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 882 (1998).
229. Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466
F. Supp. 863, 868 (D. Minn. 1979), aff'd, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The
protection afforded by the privilege, however, does not apply to the documents
obtained from Berkley's former employee, for the privilege does not apply to
stolen or lost documents."), with Crabb v. KFC Nat'l. Mgmt. Co., 952 F.2d
403 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (ex-employee's possession of privileged
document was excused, even though the breach of confidentiality was
unexplained, because efforts to preserve confidentiality were perceived to have
been adequate), and Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bemina, Inc., 91
F.R.D. 254, 260 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[R]eview of the cases, and particularly of
the evolving rule with respect to eavesdroppers, reveals that the privilege is not
simply inapplicable any time that confidentiality is breached, as plaintiffs
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cept of "inadvertent disclosure" and excused the voluntary breach of
confidentiality by the client if reasonable efforts were made to
preserve the confidentiality.230 It is also reflected in the protective
orders that courts regularly employ to expedite the pretrial discovery
process. 231 Through these orders, the voluntary production of
claim, and that the relevant consideration is the intent of the defendants to
maintain the confidentiality of the documents as manifested in the precautions
they took."). See generally RICE, supra note 3, § 9:26 (noting that stolen
documents or purloined communications do not necessarily waive attorney-
client privilege when the client is not responsible for the breach of
confidentiality).
230. Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993) ("In
our view, an analysis which permits the court to consider the circumstances
surrounding a disclosure on a case-by-case basis is preferable to a per se rule
of waiver. This analysis serves the purpose of the attorney client privilege, the
protection of communications which the client fully intended would remain
confidential, yet at the same time will not relieve those claiming the privilege
of the consequences of their carelessness if the circumstances surrounding the
disclosure do not clearly demonstrate that continued protection is warranted.");
Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int'l H.V., Nos. 90 Civ. 6328(SWK), 90 Civ.
7237(SWK), 1993 WL 6,216, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1993) ("The inadvertent
disclosure doctrine balances two competing considerations. On one hand,
errors must not be so freely forgiven that counsel will neglect to conduct
careful document reviews. On the other hand, if the privilege evaporates as
soon as any erroneous disclosure is made despite reasonable precautions,
counsel will be compelled to conduct document reviews that consume inor-
dinate amounts of their time and their clients' money in an effort to attain
perfection."), ajfd, 153 F.R.D. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See generally RICE,
supra note 3, §§ 9:70-9:77 (discussing inadvertent disclosures of privileged
communication to third parties).
231. Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
trial court had discretion to issue a protective order that limited the waiver of
the attorney-client privilege to the action in which the ineffective assistance
claim was made; Precluding the state from giving any information to
prosecutors who might want to use it if the defendant were retried); Navajo
Nation v. Peabody Coal Co., No. 00-5072, 2001 WL 312117, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 29, 2001) ("The Order specifically indicated that '[p]roduction of
documents for purposes of the present case shall not constitute a waiver of any
right of Peabody to raise a claim of privilege as to these documents in any
other present or future litigation."' (alteration in original)); In re Commercial
Fin. Servs. Inc., 247 B.R. 828, 848-49 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (granting the
petitioner a protective order that permitted it to produce an allegedly privileged
report prepared by the company's lawyers on the condition that the parties who
wished to see it had to execute a "Non-waiver Agreement," in which the
recipient agreed to keep the report confidential and not argue to any forum that
the waiver of the privilege with respect to the report resulted in a subject
matter waiver for the information underlying the report).
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privileged communications is not considered a waiver under the
protective order, and the client can assert the privilege after the op-
posing side has seen the communications. Some courts have excused
disclosures of confidential privileged communications during
negotiations for the sale of a company when the disclosures have
prevented future litigation over matters addressed in the attorney-
client communications. 232 If privileges had been codified and these
ideas had been proposed to the Committee, would they have been
shunned because they not only "upset settled expectations" but also
"would require a re-education of the Bar"?
In the corporate context, we have seen an expansion of the circle
of confidentiality from corporate executives who make decisions
based on the legal advice sought,233 to all individuals when the
communications are about matters within the scope of their
employment responsibilities, 234 and to outside consultants whose
work makes them the equivalent of virtual employees. 235 How long
232. Tenneco Packaging Specialty & Consumer Prods., Inc. v. Johnson &
Son, Inc., No. 98 C 2679, 1999 WL 754,748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1999)
("SCJ has stated that DowBrands disclosed the opinion to SCJ during the
course of due diligence, when the asset purchase deal was largely locked up.
And DowBrands took substantial steps to ensure that the opinion would remain
confidential. According to SCJ, 'access to the opinion was controlled by
specific procedures designed to prevent dissemination of its contents';
DowBrands showed the opinion to a limited number of SCJ representatives,
and then only after they acknowledged that disclosure was subject to a
confidentiality agreement. Thus, the opinion is privileged and need not be
produced."); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308,
311 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (refusing to find a waiver when Bausch & Lomb
disclosed an opinion letter to a non-party during negotiations concerning the
sale of one if its divisions. "By refusing to find waiver in these settings courts
create an environment in which businesses can share more freely information
that is relevant to their transactions. This policy lubricates business deals and
encourages more openness in transactions of this nature.").
233. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483,
485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
234. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970). See generally RICE,
supra note 3, § 4:13 (recognizing the difficulty in defining the "control group"
of individuals within a corporate structure who make decisions based on the
legal advice of counsel).
235. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Currency
Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1409, M 21-95, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18,636, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2003) (outside public relations firm);
In re Copper Market Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
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would the Committee have waited to see what the courts were
willing to do without explicit authorization in the rules? How
willing would judges have been to extend the coverage of a more
restrictive codified privilege? If some courts would have taken the
initiative and extended the rule, would the Committee have declined
to act because the problem had "been handled adequately by the
courts"? 2 36  Perhaps the Committee would have concluded that
addressing the issue would present "policy question[s] that most
courts had already worked through."
237
The sharing of communications among joint clients-clients
with a common attorney-was permitted prior to the promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The concept of sharing without
waiving was subsequently expanded to encompass "joint defense,"
i.e., individuals with separate attorneys who jointly prepare a defense
strategy in pending litigation. 238 Thereafter, the concept evolved into
a "common interest" or "community of interests" principle that
permitted individuals not preparing a litigation strategy to share
(outside public relations firm); H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter
Co., No. 95 Civ. 1274 (DC), 1995 WL 301,351 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995)
(outside public relations consultant assisted lawyer in advising client on how to
respond to the plaintiffs lawsuit); Village of Kiryas Joel Local Dev. Corp. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 90 Civ. 4970 (JFK), 1992 WL 8,207 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
16, 1992); Carte Blanche (Sing.) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc. 130
F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
236. Minutes of Oct. 18, 2002, supra note 84.
237. Id. at 12.
238. United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d
Cir. 1989); In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d
120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Hsia, 81 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C.
2000) ("[A joint defense agreement] permits a client to disclose information to
her attorney in the presence of joint parties and their counsel without waiving
the attorney-client privilege and is intended to preclude joint parties and their
attorneys from disclosing confidential information learned as a consequence of
the joint defense without permission."); Go Med. Indus. PTY, Ltd. v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., No. 3:95 MC 522(DJS), 1998 WL 1,632,525, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug.
14, 1998) ("The common interest rule extends the application of the attorney-
client privilege in circumstances where the parties are represented by separate
counsel but join in a legal defense or enterprise. Under the common interest
rule, parties and counsel involved in a joint defense or enterprise may disclose
privileged information to each other without destroying the privileged nature
of those communications." (citations omitted)).
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communications when they shared legal interests.2 39 At first, the
"legal interests" to be shared had to be identical.240 Over time, we
have seen that requirement relaxed.2 4' Would a proposal to
recognize such an expansion, before it was accepted by judges and
without explicit authorization, have been tabled because it would
have "substantially changed the case law" or because "any amend-
ment would require more than a simple substitution of one word for
another"?
242
E. Legal Advice or Assistance
The concept of "legal advice or assistance" has never been
defined with particularity. As a consequence, matters that previously
would not have been thought sufficiently "legal" in nature, like
legislative drafting and lobbying, 243 have been brought within the
scope of the privilege by judicial decisions when they have been tied
239. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Because the privilege sometimes may apply outside the context of actual
litigation, what the parties call a 'joint defense' privilege is more aptly termed
the 'common interest rule."'); In re Application of the Fed. Trade Comm'n
(Avrett Free & Ginsberg), No. M18-304 (RJW), 2001 WL 396,522, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001) ("Only communications made in the course of an
ongoing legal enterprise, and intended to further the enterprise, are protected.
However, it is not necessary that there be actual litigation in progress for the
common interest rule to apply." (citations omitted)).
240. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172
(D.S.C. 1974) (holding that parties have a community of interests "where they
have an identical legal interest with respect to the subject matter of a
communication between an attorney and a client concerning legal advice ....
The key consideration is that the nature of the interest be identical, not similar,
and be legal, not solely commercial."). The Duplan decision was widely
followed. See generally RICE, supra note 3, § 4:36 (discussing the
"community of interests" standard as it relates to attorney-client privilege).
241. Common legal interest was a recurring characterization. See In re
Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1992); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd.,
197 F.R.D. 342 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Browne of N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase
Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Am. Colloid Co. v. Old Republic, No.
93 C 0665, 1993 WL 195270 (N.D. Ill. June 7, 1993); In re Mortgage &
Reality Trust, 212 B.R. 649 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
242. Minutes of Oct. 25, 1999, supra note 57, at 7.
243. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D.
I11. 1978) (preparing a report for use in congressional testimony and public
advocacy was not legal assistance); United States Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge
Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that drafting a
letter describing lobby efforts was not legal services).
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to other traditional legal work performed by lawyers. 244 The same
has been true of public relations advice and assistance.245 Recently,
in the unpublished opinions in the consolidated MDL Microsoft
cases,246 we held 247 that confidential communications could be
shared with outside public relations consultants who were assisting
the attorney to put a public face on pending litigation. Assuming this
is a reasonable extension of the privilege, would courts ever have
ventured into this uncharted water if the privilege had been codified?
Would the Committee have shied away and done nothing if a
suggestion had been made out of fear that their actions would open
"a Pandora's box"? 248
F. Waiver
The grounds of waiver have also expanded. In Hearn v.
Rhay,249 the court held that when a claim is made that necessarily
implicates the client's communications with legal counsel because
those communications with counsel are vital to a defense of those
claims, (e.g., claiming good faith, lack of knowledge, and estoppel),
the client impliedly waives the privilege protection through his or her
affirmative conduct. 250 While the decision has not been without its
244. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir. 1978) (preparing client for congressional hearings was legal assistance); In
re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp.2d 890 (D. Md. 2004);
Coordination Proceedings: Microsoft I-V Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106 Class
Action (Super. Ct. Cal. 2003) (unpublished) (special counsel holding that the
services of lawyers and those working with the legal team was considered legal
when congressional hearings were being held and private actions involving the
same subject matter were ongoing).
245. H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95 Civ. 1274
(DC), 1995 WL 301,351 (S.D.N.Y. May, 16, 1995) (outside public relations
consultant assisted lawyer in advising client on how to respond to the
plaintiff's lawsuit).
246. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 332 F. Supp.2d 890 (D. Md.
2004) and Coordination Proceedings: Microsoft I-V Cases, J.C.C.P. No. 4106
Class Action (Cal. 2003).
247. I served as special counsel with John Cooper of Farella Braun &
Martel, San Francisco, CA, to Judge Renfrew, special master for Judge Motz,
who was coordinating the resolution of privilege claims for both the MDL and
Consolidated California actions.
248. Minutes of Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1993, supra note 17.
249. 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
250. Id. at 579-80.
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detractors, 2 1 it has been overwhelmingly accepted throughout the
federal and state systems.252 Would the Committee have been too
fearful of the consequences to experiment with such an established
principle?
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE
The legislative or quasi-legislative process of the Rules Enabling
Act addresses evidentiary issues in a manner that is completely and
profoundly inconsistent with the common law tradition through
which our rules originally evolved. Created under the common law
as a result of evidentiary needs in individual cases, the rules took
shape through their application in factual situations giving rise to
equities that judges had no choice but to address. Each judge knew
that his or her interpretation and application of a rule was binding
only in the particular case. It became part of the evolution of the rule
when it was applied in other cases and to other factual situations,
only to the extent that the judge's logic was compelling. The desires
of special interest groups seldom, if ever, played a role unless they
were parties to the suit.
In contrast, the quasi-legislative process beginning with the
Evidence Advisory Committee is not required to address anything.
The judges that predominate on the Committee have the choice of
promulgating and approving rules that address no immediate needs
that demand their creative attention, or maintaining the status quo
and letting their brethren deal with the identified problems on a case-
by-case basis. Their natural and understandable tendency is to do
little or nothing, because as one member of the Committee explained,
each change has the potential of creating more problems than it
resolves. 253 Being pragmatists as their profession compels, judges,
with dockets that are often overwhelming, choose to do as little as
possible because they would rather live with the devil they know
than confront the devil they don't know.
251. See, Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851 (3d
Cir. 1994); Allen v. West Point-Pepperell Inc., 848 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Ryall v. Appleton Elec. Co., 153 F.R.D. 660 (D. Colo. 1994).
252. See RICE, supra note 3, § 9:50; PAUL R. RICE, ATrORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: STATE LAW (Rice Publ'g CD-ROM 2004).
253. Minutes of Apr. 25, 2003, supra note 86, at 15.
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As procedural instruments, evidence rules are inherently
different from other procedural codes. The codes of civil and
criminal procedure, for example, establish uniform methods for the
initiation of legal actions. They address the procedural niceties for
the progression and resolution of the myriad, but common,
procedural problems that arise throughout litigation. While the evi-
dence rules do much the same, they are different in kind because
they address the evidentiary details of the actions that vary in type:
the nature of the evidence, how the evidence was obtained, when the
evidence is being used, what the evidence is used to prove, and
general principles of trustworthiness, fairness and unfair prejudice.
The promulgation and imposition of new, untested rules in broader
contexts is too daunting an undertaking to expect judges-regardless
of their experience-to be confident that they can successfully
accomplish without creating bigger problems than the ones they
recognize and are trying to resolve. Once this reality has been
appreciated, we will begin to understand why the common law
method for developing evidence rules on a case-by-case basis, in
which judges are expected to react only to the equities of each rule's
immediate application, is far superior to the broader-reaching
bureaucratized process under the Rules Enabling Act. This reality
also explains why the rule-making process has evolved into a
mechanism with the disadvantages of both the legislative process
(with its delays, bureaucracy, and special interests), and the common
law system that it was supposed to replace (with its uncertainties and
slow evolution).
The best, rather than the worst, of both the common law and
codification could be achieved if (1) the common law evidentiary
rule-making authority were officially recognized by abolishing the
Federal Rules of Evidence as a binding code, and (2) the role of the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence were
changed. In its modified role, the Committee would facilitate the
development of the rules by the judiciary by crystallizing current
practices in a coherent framework. It would achieve this by exposing
problems and offering preferred solutions to both existing and
developing issues-compelling nothing, but influencing through
reason and structure. Such a committee would function as something
equivalent to the Commission on Uniform State Laws vis-h-vis the
development and evolution of state evidentiary rules. Abolishing a
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binding code of evidence may bring several other significant
benefits. First, Congress might be less inclined to tinker with evi-
dentiary rules for political reasons. Second, the members of the
Advisory Committee might be more willing to engage in broader and
deeper explorations of model rules and to propose meaningful rule
changes, since those changes would not bind anyone and the
members would not have to anticipate all of the specific evidentiary
contexts. Third, rules would evolve solely on the basis of need rather
than on the basis of the desires of special interests and pressures from
Congress.
Consistency among federal judges, which was significantly
furthered in the past by the codification of rules and procedures,
would not be jeopardized if binding codification were abandoned.
The Internet's ability to instantaneously communicate judicial
decisions worldwide, coupled with the research assistance each
federal judge's law clerk provides and the guidance from a new
Advisory Committee process will collectively obviate the need to
trade the flexibility of equity-driven common law for the
bureaucratized, doubt-laden, time-restricted, and too often special
interest influenced rule-making process of our current system. I have
confidence in the integrity and competence of the judges in our
federal judiciary. They have demonstrated through their experience
with privilege rules that they do what the Advisory Committee does,
much better and faster. It's time that the predominantly judge-
manned Advisory Committee acknowledge the superiority of their
collective brethren in our new Internet age, given radically changed
communications, and put down for good this tired old dog of privi-
lege codification. It is also time for Congress to recognize the limits
of the legislative process in the judicial arena, to take a giant step
back into the future, and to do for all evidence rules what it did for
privileges in the current Evidence Code-leave their development to
the judicial wisdom of the common law that has effectively served
the needs of judicial systems for hundreds of years.
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